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ABSTRACT
Advances in semiconductor technology have brought computer-based systems into
virtually all aspects of human life. This unprecedented integration of semiconductor-
based systems in our lives has significantly increased the domain and the number
of safety-critical applications – application with unacceptable consequences of fail-
ure. Software-level error resilience schemes are attractive because they can pro-
vide commercial-off-the-shelf microprocessors with adaptive and scalable reliability.
Among all software-level error resilience solutions, in-application instruction repli-
cation based approaches have been widely used and are deemed to be the most ef-
fective. However, existing instruction-based replication schemes only protect some
part of computations i.e. arithmetic and logical instructions and leave the rest as
unprotected.
To improve the efficacy of instruction-level redundancy-based approaches, we de-
veloped several error detection and error correction schemes. nZDC (near Zero silent
Data Corruption) is an instruction duplication scheme which protects the execution
of whole application. Rather than detecting errors on register operands of memory
and control flow operations, nZDC checks the results of such operations. nZDC en-
sures the correct execution of memory write instruction by reloading stored value and
checking it against redundantly computed value. nZDC also introduces a novel con-
trol flow checking mechanism which replicates compare and branch instructions and
detects both wrong direction branches as well as unwanted jumps. Fault injection
experiments show that nZDC can improve the error coverage of the state-of-the-art
schemes by more than 10x, without incurring any more performance penalty. Further-
more, we introduced two error recovery solutions. InCheck is our backward recovery
solution which makes light-weighted error-free checkpoints at the basic block granu-
larity. In the case of error, InCheck reverts the program execution to the beginning
i
of last executed basic block and resumes the execution by the aid of preserved in-
formation. NEMESIS is our forward recovery scheme which runs three versions of
computation and detects errors by checking the results of all memory write and branch
operations. In the case of a mismatch, NEMESIS diagnosis routine decides if the er-
ror is recoverable. If yes, NEMESIS recovery routine reverts the effect of error from
the program state and resumes program normal execution from the error detection
point.
ii
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Advances in semiconductor technology has made computer-based systems coupled
with virtually all aspects of human life – ranging from inside our body systems (e.g.,
cardiovascular defibrillators or “emergency room in the chest”) to close or body (e.g.,
wearable technology, cell phones and health monitoring devices) to commutation and
transportation systems (e.g., autonomous vehicles, autonomous flight Systems and
drones). This unprecedented growth of semiconductor-based systems has significantly
increased the domain and the number of safety/mission critical applications – appli-
cations with unacceptable consequences of failure.
The execution of safety critical applications should be protected against hardware
malfunctions specifically random transient faults (Avizˇienis et al., 2004). Among the
many sources of transient faults in the semiconductor devices (e.g., electrical noise,
external interference, cross-talk, etc.) sub-atomic energetic particles that strike on
sensitive areas of a chip cause majority of transient fault induced failures in electronic
devices (Baumann, 2005a). These transient faults or soft errors temporary alter the
logical value stored in one (or more) storage element of microprocessor and their
impact will usually disappear when the erroneous data is overwritten. In most cases
the impact of such temporarily permutations do not affect the system response due
to various micro-architectural and software level derating factors (Sanda et al., 2008;
Asadi and Tahoori, 2006). In some cases, however, the erroneous value can survive
all masking effects and lead to a system level failure – unexpected output or system
crash. System failure can have different level of risk based on application reliability
requirements. While occasional failures in video game console are trivial, failures
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obstacle detection task in autonomous vehicles can lead to a tragedy. For instance,
a recent NVIDIA paper (Li et al., 2017), explain situations that soft errors hitting a
DNN (Deep Learning Neural Network) can cause crash in self-driving cars. Therefore,
soft error mitigation strategies should be adopted to eliminate or reduce the severity
of unaccepted failures in safety critical applications.
Traditionally, soft errors considered as a reliability issue for high altitude appli-
cations like spacecrafts, satellites and aircraft mainly because of the amount and
frequency of high-energy protons and heavy-ion rays in their working environment.
Fortunately, once such particles reaches to the earth’s atmosphere they cascades to
many secondary harmless low-energy particles. Yet, among these secondary particles,
neutrons occasionally cause soft error at ground-level applications (Ziegler et al., 1996;
May and Woods, 1978; Normand et al., 2010). Additionally, studies show that due to
aggressive sub-nano transistor scaling (10nm-7nm) and near-threshold supply volt-
age, nowadays even low-energy terrestrial particles like muons can cause soft errors
(Sierawski et al., 2011; Silberberg et al., 1984; Hubert et al., 2015). International
Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors (ITRS) (IRC, 2015) executive report lists
ground-level energetic (i.e., muon-induced) particles as a difficult reliability challenge
for future microprocessors.
Many researches have been performed to quantify and predict the impact of soft er-
rors on different microprocessor components including DRAM memory, SRAM mem-
ory, sequential and combinational logic circuits. While early studies predicts expo-
nential growth in transistor-level soft error rate by technology scaling (Cohen et al.,
1999; Shivakumar et al., 2002; Baumann, 2005b), recent explorations have concluded
constant or even decreasing soft error rate in advanced sub 60nm technologies (Can-
non et al., 2008; Mahatme et al., 2014). However, due to increased level of integration
(more transistors per core, more cores per chip and more chips per system) overall soft
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error system-level failures is expected to be increased (Shafique et al., 2014; Henkel
et al., 2013).
Soft error reliability issues have influenced industry standards and productions.
Contemporary functional safety standards, e.g. (ISO26262, 2011), clearly mentioned
to transient fault model as a safety thread which should be addressed to achieve high
safety integration level (i.e. ASIL C or ASIL D) for autonomous cars. State-of-the-art
modern microprocessors have already adopted a variety range of soft error mitigation
schemes in their design. For example, Intel Xeon microprocessor E7 family micropro-
cessors is equipped with error detection and correction codes (ECC) in both on-chip
caches and CPU registers to alleviate the issue of transient faults (Xeon, 2011). ARM
cortex-R dual/triple core lock-step microprocessors (Iturbe et al., 2016; Lyons, 2010)
have adopted redundant execution strategy to detect/mask the manifestation of er-
rors in real time applications. Even for general high performance applications, ARM
provides protected configuration which is equipped with ECC-protected memory sub-
system i.e. private and shared caches as well as TLBs(ARM®, 2014). Overall, the
wide adoption of transient fault mitigation schemes in major microprocessor vendors
implies the importance of soft error resilience issue even for safety-critical terrestrial
applications.
1.1 Soft Error Mitigation Schemes
Historically, designers of aircraft and satellite applications utilize RHBP (radiation-
hardened-by-process) microprocessors to cope with space-level radiation rate. In
RHBP microprocessor fabrication process is modified to mitigate soft error concerns.
Generally, such microprocessors are orders of magnitudes slower that high perfor-
mance microprocessors. For instance, the second generation of RAD750 micropro-
cessor, state-of-the-art commercially available RHBP microprocessor, are built on
3
0.18 micron feature size with 200 clock frequency and computational power of 400
MIPS (Haddad et al., 2011). RHBP is the most extensive error protection strategy,
however, the expensive cost of such techniques have restricted their applicability to
cost-agnostic systems.
To achieve high-performance and affordable error resiliency, designers adopt RHBA
(radiation-harden-by-architecture) microprocessors which in error mitigation is ac-
complished mainly by µarchitectural-level modifications. Mianly, RHBA techniques
explore spatial redundancy and execute two redundant versions of computations on
different hardware components – different core or different execution path inside a
core, and compare the redundantly computed results. Examples are IBM Z-series
servers (Spainhower and Gregg, 1999), HP NonStop systems (Bernick et al., 2005),
and HERMES embedded microprocessor (Clark et al., 2014, 2016). These techniques
achieve high degree of fault coverage in the cost of more than 2x performance, power
and area overhead. Less aggressive hardware redundant multithreading solutions exe-
cute redundant threads on simultaneous multithreaded processors and specific results
(mainly store instruction’s value and address) for error detection purposes (Reinhardt
and Mukherjee, 2000; Mukherjee et al., 2002). These approaches suffer from remark-
ably less performance degradation than fully redundant lock-stepped designs, but
they still require hardware modifications (Mukherjee et al., 2002).
Software level schemes can also be employed for soft error protection through
applying redundancy at various level of abstractions. Fine-grained instruction repli-
cation schemes (Oh et al., 2002a; Reis et al., 2005), run two (or three) versions of
assembly instructions and check their results periodically for error detection (mask-
ing). Thread-level replication solutions (Wang et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2012b;
Mitropoulou et al., 2016), execute two redundant threads of computations (possi-
bly of different cores of a multicore microprocessor) and detect the manifestation of
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errors by comparing their results. Similarly, coarse-grained process-level redundancy
schemes (Shye et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2012a), apply redundancy at process level
for error detection.
Software-level schemes are applicable on commercial microprocessors without any
hardware modification. Because of this feature they are preferable especially for
mixed-critical systems where different tasks have different level of resiliency require-
ments (Barhorst et al., 2010; Kang et al., 2014; Wells et al., 2009; Burns and Davis,
2017). For instance, consider an application which in safety-critical tasks and non-
critical tasks share underlying microprocessor. Software error mitigation techniques
(e.g. task replication) can be applied to the safety-critical tasks for error protection,
while normal tasks can be executed without any performance degradation.
1.2 Scope of This Research
In this research we focus on instruction level soft error mitigation schemes because
of their extreme fine-grained flexibility and fast error detection capability. These
solutions can selectively be applied on the most critical part of computations (in-
structions) even inside a task or function. In fact, recent studies (Feng et al., 2010;
Laguna et al., 2016), have shown that considerable error protection can be achieved
by selective instruction-level redundancy in the cost of low performance degradation.
Despite of these advantages, the existing instruction-level replication techniques can
only meet the reliability requirements for medium- and less-critical computations and
fail to achieve high error resiliency (detection+recovery) demanded by high-critical
tasks.
The main goal of this research is to advice compiler level soft error resilient schemes
which can provide complete, effective and timely recovery for general purpose applica-
tions. Particularly, we focus on protecting the execution of programs against against
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soft errors affecting microprocessor on-core components excluding caches and TLBs.
That is because memory subsystem can be protected efficiently and effectively by er-
ror detection and correction codes. In fact, in many embedded processors like ARM
Cortex-A53 the costumer can select cache protection version of the processor which
in caches and TLB are protected by ECC (ARM®, 2015).
1.3 Contributions
This thesis makes the following contributions:
1. nZDC: A novel comprehensive in-thread instruction duplication approach that
detects the manifestation of soft errors in all microprocessor on-core compo-
nents. Against the state-of-the-art schemes which can only protect computa-
tional instructions, the proposed scheme protect the execution of all program
instructions against soft errors.
2. InCheck: An in-application error detection and backward recovery scheme
which achieves comprehensive, safe and timely soft error resiliency. The pro-
posed schemes make light-weight verified checkpoints at basic block granularity
and reverts the program execution to the beginning of last executed basic block
after error manifestation detection.
3. NEMESIS: A compiler-level error detection, diagnosis and forward recovery
scheme. The proposed scheme expands the sphere-of-protection of existing in-
struction replication techniques from the execution of computational instruc-
tions to the absolutely all program instructions. It replaces computationally
expensive software majority-voting routines with cheap error detectors. In the
case of error, diagnosis and recovery routines allow for quick recovery, and exe-
cution will be resumed error-free.
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4. gZDC: A general soft error detection scheme which detects hard-to-detect
control-flow errors as well as data-flow errors. The proposed solution com-
bines the best aspects of the existing state-of-the-art data and flow schemes
and introduces coarse-grained main-redundant instruction scheduler and asym-
metric control-flow signatures. Fault injection experiments on different hard-
ware components of synthesizable Verilog description of an OpenRISC-based
microprocessor shows that the effectiveness of the proposed solution.
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reveals the vulner-
able windows in the existing instruction-level error detection schemes and describes
a novel instruction-replication soft error detection schemes. The proposed scheme
considerably increases the error detection coverage of the state-of-the-art schemes.
Chapter 3 explains the flaws in state-of-the-art in-application error recovery scheme
and introduces a safe and fast backward recovery solution. Chapter 4 discusses a
novel soft error forward recovery scheme. Chapter 5 explains a generic soft error
detection and shows RTL-level fault injection results. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes
this dissertation and proposes possible future extensions.
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Chapter 2
ERROR DETECTION BY INSTRUCTION DUPLICATION1
2.1 Introduction
In order to achieve a low-cost and flexible fault tolerance mechanism, several
software-level techniques have been proposed. Among software-only fault tolerance
techniques, low-level instruction duplication based schemes (Oh et al., 2002a; Reis
et al., 2005, 2007; Feng et al., 2010; Khudia et al., 2012; Mitropoulou et al., 2013b;
Yu et al., 2009) are the most popular ones because they provide flexible protection
without imposing any inter-thread or inter-core communication overhead. The key
idea behind such methods is time redundancy and that error protection is possible by
redundant execution and result checking. Instruction-level error detection schemes
usually divide programmer available registers into two sets of registers and replicate
program instructions with different registers. Error detection is accomplished by
simply checking the results of redundant instructions. In this chapter, we review the
state-of-the-art instruction duplication error detection schemes. Then, We highlight
the limitations of existing schemes and propose our solution to enhance the error
detection ability of existing solutions. Finally, we evaluate the effectiveness of our
proposed scheme by processor-wide µarchitectural-level fault injection experiments.
1This chapter combines two published papers, Didehban, Moslem, and Aviral Shrivastava.
“nZDC: A compiler technique for near Zero Silent Data Corruption.” Proceedings of the 53rd
Annual Design Automation Conference. ACM, 2016 and Didehban, Moslem, and Aviral Shrivas-
tava.“A Compiler Technique for Processor-Wide Protection From Soft Errors in Multithreaded En-
vironments.”IEEE Transactions on Reliability 67.1 (2018): 249-263The publishers permit authors
to include partial or complete papers of their own in a dissertation.
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(O1) mov  x3, #0xff
(O2) load x1, [x3, #40]
(O3) add  x3, x1, #4
(O4) store x3, [x2, #32]
(s1) mov    x3, #0xff
(s2) mov    x3*, #0xff
(s3) cmp    x3, x3*
(s4) b.ne   error
(s5) load   x1, [x3, #40]
(s6) mov   x1*, x1
(s7) add    x3, x1, #4
(s8) add    x3*, x1*, #4
(s9) cmp      x3, x3*
(s10) b.ne   error
(s11) cmp   x2, x2*
(s12) b.ne   error
(s13) store  x3, [x2, #32]
.BB0:
(O1’) cmp  x1, x2
(O2’) b.eq  .BB1
.
.
.
.BB1:
…
(s1’) cmp x1, x1*
(s2’) b.ne error
(s3’) cmp x2, x2*
(s4’) b.ne    error
(s5’) cmp    x1, x2
(s6’)  xor    RTS, #sig-BB0, #sig-BB1
(s7’) b.eq  .BB1
(s8’)  xor    RTS, #sig-BB0, #sig-BB2
.
.
.
.BB1:
(s9’)  xor    GSR, GSR, RTS
(s10’) cmp    GSR, #sig-BB1
(s11’) b.ne error
….
(a) (b)
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Figure 2.1: SWIFT transformation: part (a) data flow protection and (b) control
flow protection.
2.2 Related Work
Error Detection by Duplicated Instructions or EDDI (Oh et al., 2002a) scheme
is one of the pointers of instruction-replication based schemes. EDDI partitions pro-
grammer visible registers and program memory space into partitions. EDDI transfor-
mation replicates all program computational and memory instructions with different
set of registers. EDDI checks the results of redundant computations for error detec-
tion right before the execution of memory write and conditional branch instructions.
In an attempt to improve the performance and fault coverage of EDDI, SWIFT
(Reis et al., 2005) eliminates the need of memory duplication by assuming that the
memory subsystem is protected (by other means such as ECC). In SWIFT transfor-
mation, all computational/logical instructions are duplicated with different registers
and the checking instructions are inserted before three type of instructions: a) mem-
ory read operations, b) memory write operations, and c) control flow instructions,
i.e., compare, branch, and function calls. Figure 2.1(a) shows the SWIFT data flow
transformation and the corresponding original code. In the Figure, shadow registers
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are differentiated from the master ones by an star (x1* is the shadow for x1). In
the snippet code presented in the Figure, original “mov”(inst. O1) and “add”(inst.
O2) instructions are duplicated by SWIFT transformation which are marked as DI
(Duplicatable Instruction) in the Figure. SWIFT transformation does not duplicate
the memory read instructions and it checks for errors in memory address register
of memory read operations before the execution of such instructions and copies the
loaded value into the corresponding shadow register right after the execution of load
instruction. SWIFT memory read instruction transformation is marked by read in
the Figure. For the “load” (inst. S5) instruction, the value of address register x3 is
checked against the redundant-computed value x3*, before the execution of “load”
instruction and the loaded value x1 is copied into the corresponding shadow register
x1* right after the “load” instruction. We named this extra “move” instructions (inst.
S6) as “copying-move” instruction. SWIFT transformation only executes one version
of memory write instructions and the checks the register operands of such instructions
before their execution for error detection. The memory write instruction transforma-
tion is marked as Write in the Figure. The “store” instruction register operands, x3
and x2 are checked against their shadows x3* and x2* before the execution of store
instruction.
To protect the execution of programs against control flow errors, SWIFT checks
register operands of “compare” instructions and uses statically-assigned signatures to
detect errors affecting the execution of “branch” instructions. Figure 2.1(b) shows
SWIFT control flow transformation. Before the execution of cmp (inst. s5’), its
register operands x1 and x2 are checked against their shadow registers x1* and x2*.
SWIFT transformation statistically assigns a specific number (called signature) to
each basic block and uses two specific registers (named RTS and GSR) to dynamically
recompute basic blocks signatures. It declares a control flow error, if dynamically cal-
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culated signature does not match with the statistically assigned signature. Before each
“branch” instruction or at the end of each basic block, the RTS (Run-time-Signature)
register is computed from the current basic block signature and the branch destination
basic block signature (inst. S6’ and S8’). The control flow error detection takes place
in the beginning of each basic block by extracting the basic block signature from the
RTS and GSR (General Signature Register) registers and checking the dynamically
calculated signature against the statically-assigned ones (labeled as Sign-check in
the Figure).
For more than a decade, SWIFT has been considered as the most effective in-
thread instruction duplication technique in terms of fault coverage. Acknowledging
the near perfect fault detection ability of SWIFT, several works have tried to improve
the performance overhead of SWIFT transformation (Feng et al., 2010; Khudia et al.,
2012; Mitropoulou et al., 2013b; Yu et al., 2009; Mitropoulou et al., 2013b). For in-
stance, authors of Shoestring (Feng et al., 2010) paper express that “SWIFT has the
advantage of being purely software-based, thus requiring no specialized hardware, and
can achieve nearly 100% coverage”. Targeting non-critical applications, Shoestring
compromises between fault coverage and performance overhead of instruction dupli-
cation by taking advantage of low-level hardware symptom detectors and applying
instruction duplication to those instructions which error on them most likely cause
no symptom. Similarly, research IPAS (Laguna et al., 2016), also apply instruc-
tion duplication judiciously of most critical instructions of programs and trades off
coverage for effiency. On the other hand, DRIFT (Mitropoulou et al., 2013b) and
ESoftCheck (Yu et al., 2009) try to improve SWIFT performance overhead without
jeopardizing its fault coverage. A recent study explores the use of vector instruction
for instruction replication-based fault tolerant techniques and illustrates considerable
performance improvements (Chen et al., 2016).
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2.3 Limitations of state-of-the-art schemes
Ideally, a perfect software fault detection scheme should be able to protect the
execution of a program against soft errors on various hardware components. How-
ever, the main error coverage limitation of existing instruction duplication techniques
is that they can only detect the impact of errors on the execution of some instruc-
tions (i.e., the ones that they replicate) and leave the rest unprotected. To provide
a detailed analysis of the protection offered by instruction duplication techniques,
in particular SWIFT (Reis et al., 2005), we investigate the impact of single bit flip
transient faults on different hardware components while executing a SWIFT-protected
program. We consider an in-order baseline processor (shown in Figure 2.2) and ex-
amine the impact of errors on different type of instructions in a SWIFT-protected
code. We limit our analysis to the microprocessor core components excluding branch
predictor and memory subsystem. We do not consider soft errors on branch predictor
structure because we assume that soft errors affecting branch predictor will affect the
performance of the processor not its functionality (Mukherjee et al., 2003). We as-
sume that memory subsystem including TLBs and caches ECC are protected by ECC
(Error detection and Correct Code) and the data is protected while it is in memory.
However, faults on cache controllers while decoding an address can still result to a
wrong access (read/write) to the memory (Borucki et al., 2008).
First, we classify the instructions in a SWIFT-protected code into 7 categories: i)
Duplicable Instructions (DIs): these are program computational/logical instructions
which are duplicated by SWIFT transformation, ii) Memory Read Instructions (Mem-
Read): These are load instructions that SWIFT checks their address register before
their execution, iii) Copying-move (CopMov) instructions: these are inserted after
MemRead instructions to provide consistent input replication for shadow and master
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Figure 2.2: Baseline processor. Note that Caches and branch predictor are excluded
from our error coverage analysis.
instructions, iV) Memory Write instructions (MemWrite): wherein value and address
register operands are checked before their execution, v) Original Compare (OrgCMP)
instructions: wherein register operands are checked to prevent control flow errors, vi)
Original Branch (OrgBR) instructions, and vii) Checking Instructions (CIs), which
includes instruction responsible for updating the RTS and GSR registers, checking
for discrepancy in signatures or redundantly computed registers, and terminating the
program execution in case of error.
Table 2.1 summarizes the protection offered by SWIFT in the presence of sin-
gle bit-flip error in different hardware components. The rows in the Table represent
various type of instructions in a SWIFT-protected program and the columns show
various hardware components. If SWIFT transformation is able to detect the effect
of errors in component Comp., while it is utilized with instruction Inst., the letter
P (Protected) is placed in the corresponding location (Inst.,comp.) in the Table.
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Table 2.1: Software-hardware view of SWIFT Protection
Inst. Type Fetch Decode IQ FUs Commit LSQ RF
DI P1 P P P P na P
MemRead NP2 NP NP NP NP NP NP
CopMov P P P P P na3 NP
MemWrite NP NP NP NP NP NP NP
OrgCMP NP NP NP NP NP na NP
OrgBr NP NP P P P na NP
CI NP NP P P P na P
1 Protected. 2 NotProtected. 3 not applicable.
Otherwise, it is filled by NP (NotProtected), which means SWIFT transformation
cannot protect the execution of instruction Inst. against faults in the hardware com-
ponent Comp.
Duplicable Instructions (DIs): The first row in the table says that SWIFT trans-
formation can detect errors affecting the execution of duplicated instruction, regard-
less of the location of fault. If error happens on any hardware component while pro-
cessing a DI instruction, the impact of error will get masked or detected by SWIFT
checking instructions. It is worth mentioning that if an error hits some specific bits
in the micro-architectural resources, e.g., the valid-bit of an entry holding two re-
dundant instants of a duplicated instruction, the error alters both instructions in the
same way and remains undetected.
Memory Read Instructions (MemRead): As the second row of table 2.1 shows,
SWIFT transformation leaves memory read instructions unprotected during their
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execution. This is because there is no redundant version or execution check for load
instructions. Therefore, all errors which modify the address or the size of loaded value
can result to a failure. Examples of such errors are: errors that hit fetch, decode, or
issue stage registers while they are occupied by load instruction. Errors on functional
unit that is responsible for load effective address calculation. Errors on memory read
request address or target data size while the load request is processing in the load-
store queue. Even if an error hits the source register of a memory read instruction
(e.g., register x3 of load in Figure 2.1(a)) before getting directly2 accessed by the
memory read instruction, it will cause a wrong-memory-location access error. Note
that in this case, since the state of load address register is different from its shadow,
the error will remain undetected if the next access to the load source register is a
write.
Note that the execution of memory read instructions are unprotected in many
similar instruction-based replication techniques (Chen et al., 2016; Reis and August,
2006; Mitropoulou et al., 2013a; Martinez-Alvarez et al., 2012; Reis et al., 2006, 2007;
Wang et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2012b; Yu et al., 2009; Khudia et al., 2012; Yu et al.,
2008, 2007).
Copying Mov Instructions (CopMov): Soft error on all microprocessor hardware
components, expect register file, while processing CopMov instructions is covered by
SWIFT transformation. If an error hits a CopMov instruction source registers (e.g.,
x1 of CopMov instruction (inst. s6) in the Figure 2.1(a)), the error will propagate
from master register (x1), to its corresponding shadow register (x1*) and remain
unnoticed.
All instruction replication based techniques that do not duplicate the memory read
2An instruction accesses a register directly, if that is the last access to the register so far.
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instructions (Chen et al., 2016; Reis and August, 2006; Reis et al., 2006; Mitropoulou
et al., 2013a; Martinez-Alvarez et al., 2012; Reis et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2007; Zhang
et al., 2012b; Yu et al., 2009; Khudia et al., 2012; Yu et al., 2008, 2007), also suffer
from this vulnerable interval.
Memory Write Instructions (MemWrite): Similar to MemRead instructions,
memory write instructions are also vulnerable all through their execution. Errors
affecting opcode, data and address register pointers, immediate, shift, size and rotate
field while a memory write instruction is processing by pipeline registers are the ex-
amples of such undetected errors. Likewise, errors altering memory effective address
while the instruction is utilizing functional unit or load-store queues also remain un-
detected. Furthermore, the operands of store instructions are also susceptible to soft
errors that occur before the register gets accessed directly by such instructions. How-
ever, there is a chance that such errors in register file are detected by the upcoming
checking instructions, if the next access to faulty registers is a read. Memory write in-
structions are also single-point-of-failure in many fine-grained instruction replication
techniques (Xu et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2016; Reis and August, 2006; Mitropoulou
et al., 2013a; Martinez-Alvarez et al., 2012; Feng et al., 2010; Reis et al., 2007, 2006;
Wang et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2012b; Yu et al., 2009, 2007, 2008; Mitropoulou et al.,
2013b; Liu et al., 2015; Xiong and Tan, 2013; Chen et al., 2016).
Original Compare Instructions (OrgCMP): As the Figure 2.1(b) shows, SWIFT
transformation adds checks to the operands of compare (inst. s5’) to avoid wrong-
direction control flow errors. However, since the compare instruction itself is not
duplicated, errors during the execution of compare instruction itself, can change the
control-flow of the program and remain undetected. Note that in this case, the
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signature-based part of SWIFT control flow checking mechanism is also unable to de-
tect the error because the RTS register is set for both (taken or not-taken) directions
(inst. s6’ and s8’). There are many similar techniques (Xu et al., 2013; Chen et al.,
2016; Reis and August, 2006; Mitropoulou et al., 2013a; Martinez-Alvarez et al., 2012;
Feng et al., 2010; Reis et al., 2007, 2006; Yu et al., 2009, 2007, 2008; Mitropoulou
et al., 2013b; Liu et al., 2015; Xiong and Tan, 2013; Chen et al., 2016; Oh et al.,
2002a) that suffer from the same control-flow vulnerability.
Original Branch Instructions (OrgBr): The original branch instructions are vul-
nerable to soft errors when they are in the fetch and decode units. If an error changes
the branch opcode or condition field of a branch instruction, it can change the direct
of the branch from taken to not-taken or vice versa, and the error remains unnoticed.
Most of the errors that change the target address of a branch will get detected by the
signature-part of the SWIFT control flow checking mechanism. However, if an error
causes a jump back to the body of the source basic-block (after the signature-checking
instructions) it still remains undetected because the signature-checking part is already
passed. Furthermore, in table 2.1 it is noted that the branch instructions are not pro-
tected in the register file. This is because the source register for (direct or indirect)
branch instructions is the program status flag register, which holds Zero, Overflow,
Negative, and Carry bits, and if error happens on the flag register, the direction of
branch will be changed and the error is undetectable. For function calls, depending
on the implementation, if just one copy of registers is sent to the callee function,
the registers are unprotected between checking (in caller function) and duplicating
time (in callee function). Many of similar works (Xu et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2016;
Reis and August, 2006; Mitropoulou et al., 2013a; Martinez-Alvarez et al., 2012; Feng
et al., 2010; Reis et al., 2007, 2006; Yu et al., 2009, 2007, 2008; Mitropoulou et al.,
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2013b; Liu et al., 2015; Xiong and Tan, 2013; Chen et al., 2016) also suffer suffer the
same problem.
Checking Instructions (CI): SWIFT transformation inserts a plenty of checking
instructions into the code to ensure the correct execution of the program. These
checking instructions are either redundant-register mismatch-checking instructions
(i.g. instructions s3, s4, s9, s10, s11, s12, s1’, s2’, s3’ and s4’ in the Figure 2.1) or
signature setting/checking instructions (i.g. instructions s’6, s8’, s9’, s10’ and s11’).
Generally, errors affecting these instructions just cause false alarms and not lead to a
failure. However, in some special cases (e.g., opcode of a CI instruction changes to a
store instruction), it is possible that the program experiences failure because of soft
error on a CI instruction.
Overall, the memory and control-flow instructions are the main single-point-of-
failures in many in-thread instruction replication-based techniques. In (Blem et al.,
2013; Patterson and Hennessy, 2013) the amount of MemRead, MemWrite, OrgCMP
and OrgBr instructions are reported as 50%, 55%, and 40% on average for X86, ARM,
and MIPS processors, respectively.
2.4 nZDC: Our Proposed Instruction Duplication Error Detection Solution
In this section, we present nZDC (a compiler technique for near Zero silent Data
Corruption), a compiler approach to almost eliminate SDCs. In line with previous
researches, we assume that soft errors can modify the data within the CPU but
memory and caches are protected by other orthogonal techniques such as ECC. The
salient features of nZDC are:
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store    X1, [X2]
load     X1, [X2*]
cmp     X1, X1*
b.ne     error
store     X1, [X2]
store     X1, [X2]
load      X1*, [X2*]
cmp      X1, X1*
b.ne       error
(a) Original (b) First-cut (c) nZDC
Figure 2.3: nZDC store checking mechanism
nZDC Protects Stores by Checking-load Strategy
nZDC introduces the concept of “checking load instruction” to make sure that the
store instruction has executed fault free. The main idea here is to load back the stored
value from the memory and check that against the stored value, if they match there
is no error otherwise error handler routine get involved. Figure 2.3(b) shows the first-
cut of our approach to insert checking load instruction. Although it can detect errors
which affect the address part of the store instruction, yet errors on value part can
simply propagate from the store’s value register to checking load value registers, and
remain undetected. For instance, if soft error alters the value of X1, store instruction
writes the erroneous value into memory. Later, the checking load instruction loads
the corrupted value to X1* register. Now, both X1 and X1* have same wrong values
and comparing them cannot catch the error. This happens because the value register
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of checking load instruction is the shadow of the value register of store instruction.
nZDC protects stores by using the same value register for both store and checking
load instructions and later check that register against its shadow for soft error (Figure
2.3(c)). By this method, in addition to the producer chains of store value and address
registers, the execution of store instruction itself is also protected.
The performance overhead of nZDC solution for store instruction may seem high
at first, but thanks to store-to-load forwarding mechanism in LSQ of modern micro-
processor, the checking load instructions normally take their values from forwarding
path in load-store unit and executes very fast. The only problem here is, if error
happens on store buffer after that the store forwarded its data to the checking load
instruction, the error may remain undetected. This unprotected interval can be com-
pletely removed in two ways; i) flush store buffer after each store, or ii) use ECC in
store buffer. The former comes with significant performance degradation; it is similar
to the case that there is no store buffer at all. The second approach may not have
performance overhead, but the ECC code should be generated before the stores arrive
at the store buffer.
nZDC Protects Loads by Relax Duplication Strategy
Memory read instructions are the most frequent unprotected instruction in SWIFT
and many other software redundancy based techniques (Khudia et al., 2012; Yu et al.,
2009). These instructions behave such as the input of duplicated instructions chain,
and if a memory read instruction gets faulty, the execution can go wrong and checking
instructions are unable to detect such an error.
Our solution for memory read instructions is simple, we use ”load” duplication,
which in memory read instructions get duplicated as well as logical and computational
instructions. The load instruction duplication has two advantages; 1) it protects load
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L1:
load x1  [x2];
load x1*  [x2*];
if ( x1 != x1*) 
jump  .Diagnosis;
L2:
.Diagnosis
if ( x2 != x2*)
jump .SoftError(Local);
counter++;
if (counter > THRESHOLD)
counter = 0;
load x1  [x2];
mov x1*, x1;
jump    .L2;
jump    .L1;
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x1, x2 x1*, x2*
Figure 2.4: nZDC load instruction transformation for shared memory access in
multithreaded applications.
instructions completely during their execution in pipeline, LSQ and removes load-
related register file vulnerable intervals (Marked as X3-vul-load in Figure 2.1), and 2) it
saves performance overhead by reducing the number of checking instructions.
The load instruction duplication may introduce false alarms for memory access to
the shared memory in multithreaded applications if an intervening store changes the
state of the memory between redundant load accesses. Figure 2.4 illustrates nZDC
memory read instruction transformation for shared memory access in multithreaded
applications. As it shows, nZDC transformation redirects the program control to a
diagnosis block if the results of redundant loads are different. In the diagnosis block,
it first checks for errors in loads address registers (x2 and x2* in the Figure 2.4). In
case of mismatch, the soft error detection flag will be raised. If there is no error in
replicated load address registers, there can be two possibilities for the inconsistency:
(1) soft error happens during the execution of one of the load instructions and for
instance, alters the effective address, or (2) intervening store from the other thread
has modified the state of the memory. Either way, by jumping back to right before
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BB1
BB2
BB3
//body of BB1
(c1) cmp op1, op2
(c2) b.condition .BB3
Taken
Not-Taken
//body of BB3
//body of BB2
BB1
BB2
BB3
//body of BB1
(zc1) subs      CDR  op1 - op2
(zc2) if (condition)    CDR  invert (CDR)
(zc3) XOR       CDR, CDR, #sig-BB2
(zc4) subs      CCR  op1* - op2*
(zc5) b.condition .BB3
(zc6) b.condition .error
(zc7) if (! condition)    CDR  invert (CDR)
(zc8) XOR       CDR, CDR, diff(#sig-BB1, #sig-BB2)
Taken
Not-Taken
(zc11) XOR    CDR, CDR, #sig-BB3
(zc12) XNOR       CCR, CCR, CDR
//body of BB3
check   CCR, #0, .error(MemUnSafe)
(zc9) XOR    CDR, CDR, #sig-BB2
(zc10) XNOR   CCR, CCR, CDR
//body of BB2
check   CCR, #0, .error(MemUnSafe)
(a) (b)
Figure 2.5: nZDC Control Flow Checking Mechanism. All errors detected by
control-flow checking mechanism are considered as global errors (error is propagated
to the memory).
redundant-load instructions, the problem will be solved. If soft error was the reason
for the discrepancy (mismatch between x1 and x1* in Figure 2.4), simply re-execution
provides recovery. If the discrepancy comes from an intervening store instruction (like
race condition), the problem will be solved by repeating the execution of redundant
loads. However, to prevent a program from going to an infinite loop (due to frequent
memory update by other threads between the redundant loads instructions) nZDC
transformation uses a threshold-based mechanism. Basically, it counts the number
of iterations that a particular diagnosis routine has been involved (counter++ in
Figure 2.4). If the number of iterations exceeds a predefined value, the nZDC first
resets the counter. Then performs just one load and copies the loaded value to the
corresponding shadow register, and transfers the program execution to right after
the checking instructions in the original control flow of the program. Note that
since the execution of diagnosis block is rare, the performance overhead of nZDC
transformation is acceptable.
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nZDC Control-Flow Checking Mechanism
An effective control flow checking mechanism should be able to protect all of the
control flow determining parts of the execution; which are a) Operands of compare
instructions, b) pipeline registers while executing compare instruction, c) conditional
registers (NVCZ flags) and d) branch instructions. Against the existing control flow
checking mechanism which can partially protect some of these parts, nZDC control
flow checking mechanism can effectively protect all control flow checking determining
components. The nZDC control flow mechanism (shown in Figure 2.5) demands
two general purpose registers, called CDR (Compare Destination Register) and CCR
(Compare Check Register). The nZDC control flow checking mechanism works based
on three main insides: a) compare and branch instruction replication, b) protect
NVZC flag register by conditionally inverting the value of CDR register based on the
direction of the following conditional branch, and c) use static signatures for source-
encoding/destination-decoding to make sure that the control flow of the program is
traversed correctly. The nZDC control flow mechanism consists of five main steps:
Duplicating CMP instruction: Generally, in ARM and X86 ISAs, a compare
(CMP) instruction is implemented by a subtraction (SUB) instruction which disre-
gards the results of the subtraction operation and updates the program status flags
(NVZC). Leveraging this fact, nZDC control flow transformation converts all pro-
gram compare instructions to their equivalent subtraction operations and duplicates
them. However, rather than disregarding the results, nZDC control flow transfor-
mation saves the results of the subtraction operation into CDR and CCR registers.
In Figure 2.5, instructions (zc1) and (zc4) are for duplicated versions of the original
CMP instruction (c1).
Conditionally inverting the CDR: Since the NVZC register is not duplicable,
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nZDC uses time redundancy to protect that register against soft errors. For instance,
as Figure 2.5 shows, at time t, the first CMP instruction(zc1) sets the NVZC flag,
which is going to be read by the following conditional invert instruction(zc2) at the
next cycle (assuming 1 cycle per instruction). The second CMP instruction(zc4) will
be set to the NVZC flag at time t+3, and the flag register will be read by conditional
branch instruction(zc5) at time t+4. If the first CMP instruction(zc1) sets the NVZC
flag in such way that the condition of the following conditional branch(zc5) is true,
the CDR register gets inverted right after the first SUBS instruction (zc1). On the
other hand, if the condition is not true and branch is suppose to be not taken, the
CDR gets inverted after the branch (zc7). In a fault free run of the program for
each conditional branch, the CDR inverts just one time. Although this conditional
instructions is ISA dependent, it can be replaced with a micro if the ISA does not
support these instructions.
Duplicating branch Operations: nZDC duplicates all programs conditional
branch instructions. However, the branch target addresses for the copy branch (zc6)
is error handler basic block. The purpose of branch duplication is to protect the
soft errors on the branch opcode. The main idea is if the condition is true, the main
branch (instruction I5) will change the control flow of the program and the redundant
one does not execute. If the condition is not true neither of the branches changes
the control flow. But if errors happen on the original branch opcode, e.g., branch
changes from blt (branch less than) to bgt (branch greater than) and if it changes
from taken to not-taken, the redundant branch detects the error. On the other hand,
if soft error alters the direction of a conditional branch from not-taken to taken, nZDC
control-flow checking instructions detects that in the wrong target basic block.
Adding destination signature: Based on the possible destination, the CDR
register gets XORed with a unique and basic block signature assigned to all program
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Table 2.2: Simulator parameters
Parameter Value
CPU Model ARM64 bit in-order processor
Pipeline Two issue/4-stage
# of FUs 2Int, 1Mul, 1Div, 1Float, 1Mem
L1 D/I-Cache 64KB (2-way) / 32KB (2-way)
Integer register file 32 registers (64-bit width)
Store buffer size 5 entries
basic block statically. Instruction(zc3) shows the destination related signature coding
if branch is taken, otherwise instruction(zc8) performs the signature coding for the
next basic block.
Inserting control-flow checking instructions: In order to check if the di-
rection of a branch has been taken correctly, nZDC inserts two instructions at the
beginning of the all program’s basic blocks. The first instruction XORs the CDR reg-
ister with the current basic block signature (zc10 in BB2 and zc9 in BB3) and saves
the result back to the CDR register. The next instruction XNORs the CDR and CCR
registers (zc12 in BB2 and zc10 in BB3) and stores the result in CCR. In a fault free
run of the program execution, before XNOR instruction, the value of CDR should be
equal to the inverted value of CCR. Therefore, after the XNOR instruction the CCR
register value should be always Zero because the inputs for the xnor instruction are
each other inverse (one’s complement). Finally the nZDC control flow error detecting
instructions will be inserted into two points of execution: 1) before each write to the
CCR (between inst zc3 and zc4), and 2) before all function calls and direct branches.
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2.5 Experimental methodology
We have performed extensive fault injection testing to evaluate the effectiveness
of nZDC and SWIFT in reducing SDCs.
Compilation framework: We have implemented nZDC and SWIFT transfor-
mations as late backend passes in LLVM3.7 compiler infrastructure (Lattner and
Adve, 2004) after register allocation and instruction scheduler. This implementation
enables us to take advantage of all of the advanced compiler optimizations includ-
ing Common Sub-expression Elimination (CSE) and Dead Code Elimination (DCE).
We test the effectiveness of SWIFT and nZDC on applications from the Mibench
benchmark suite.
Simulation environment: We have used the gem5 (Binkert et al., 2011) - a
popular cycle-accurate microarchitectural simulator. The simulator was run in ARM
syscall emulation mode and modeled the ARMv8-a profile of the ARM64 bit archi-
tecture. We have used a two-way in-order ARM architecture for fault injection ex-
periments with the details of the processor configuration in Table 2.2. The simulated
CPU model is very close to “cache protection configuration” of ARM Cortex-A53, a
popular modern high performance low power embedded microprocessor. In this con-
figuration of ARM cortex-A53 the memory subsystem including TLB, instruction and
data L1 caches, and L2 data cache are protected with error detection and correction
codes.
Fault sites: Instead of injecting faults just on processor’s register file, we inject
faults on all the major sequential component of the processor. For the in-order ARM,
this includes the pipeline registers, load-store queue and functional units. All the
other components are either not vulnerable (e.g., the branch predictor), or are al-
ready assumed protected (e.g., the caches and the TLBs). Additionally, to show the
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effectiveness of the nZDC control-flow checking, we specifically perform fault injection
on the branch and compare instructions while they are in the processor’s pipeline.
Fault injection experiments: For each fault site, a random bit in a random
time is selected and inverted. For example in the case of register file, at the start of
each experiment a physical register, a bit and a cycle is selected randomly for fault
injection. Simulation runs the program normally till the selected cycle. Then the
value inside the selected bit gets inverted, and the program runs until completion or
allowable simulation time (which is 10 times the nominal execution time) gets over.
For each fault site, 400 faults are injected which gives us a 5% margin of error and
95% confidence interval (Leveugle et al., 2009). This means, that for each version
of the program (original, SWIFT and nZDC), 2400 fault injection experiments are
performed. Among them 2000 faults are injected into register file, pipeline registers,
load store queue, functional units, and the rest, 400 faults, are specifically injected
into the main branch and compare instructions. Overall, we inject 72,000 faults in
various components of the processors.
Output classification: Since the main goal of this work is to prevent a program
from producing the wrong output because of soft errors, the result of each fault
injection trial is classified into two categories: 1. SDC: The simulation runs which are
terminated normally, but produce wrong output, and 2. Others: All other scenarios
i.e, masked faults, detected fault, segmentation fault and crash fall into this category.
Comparison Metric
The common practice to evaluate the efficacy of software fault tolerant techniques is
by comparing percentage of failures/SDCs extracted from statistical fault injection
with performing the same number of fault injection experiments for original and
protected versions of the programs (Xu et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2016; Reis and
27
August, 2006; Mitropoulou et al., 2013a; Martinez-Alvarez et al., 2012; Feng et al.,
2010; Reis et al., 2007, 2006; Wang et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2012b; Yu et al., 2009,
2007, 2008; Mitropoulou et al., 2013b; Liu et al., 2015; Xiong and Tan, 2013; Chen
et al., 2016; Oh et al., 2002a). However, since usually software fault tolerant methods
prolong the execution time of the program, they can decrease the percentage of SDCs
just by increasing the amount of masked or detected errors caused by the faults
that influenced the program-irrelevant parts of execution (Schirmeier et al., 2015).
Program-irrelevant parts of execution is the segment of the execution time that is not
part of the original program, but is needed to protect the original program, such as
the duration of time that the processor spends to execute the redundant and control
flow checking related instructions in SWIFT/nZDC protected programs. To clearly
express the main idea of this section, we use a simplified example of running original
and FT versions of a program on a simple in-order CPU. The execution time trace is
shown in Figure 2.6.
As the figure shows, the original program, marked as ORG, starts its execution at
time 0 and finishes at time 10. During the execution of this program, we assume some
intervals as Vulnerable (V) and some as Non-Vulnerable (NV), which means if soft
error happens on V interval, it leads to program failure, and, if fault occurs on NV
interval, it will get masked. This program spends 4 units of time in V intervals and 6
in NV intervals. Now, assume that 10 random fault injection have been performed on
this program. In an ideal random fault injection, one fault would happen on each unit
of time, and since 6 units of execution time is NV and 4 is V, the amount of failures
should be 4, or 40%. Now, consider a hypothetically FT version of the program.
FT version of the program has two parts; first part is exactly similar to the original
ones, and the second part is just No-operations (NOP). The execution time of the
FT version is as twice as the original one, which makes the execution time of the FT
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Figure 2.6: Vulnerable and Non-Vulnerable intervals for original and FT version of
hypothetical program
version 20 units of time. Now, assume we perform the same random fault injection
experiments that we did on the original version of the program (10 fault injection). If
we randomly select 10 cycles to perform fault injection, statistically speaking, most
likely 5 of them would occur on the second part of the program (the NOP execution
part) which is NV interval, and therefore, will not result in failure. From the 5
remaining faults, happening on the first part of the FT program, 2 will happen on
V intervals and 3 should happen on NV intervals. Therefore, the number of failures
in this case is 2, or 20% of total injected faults. Although the ideal statistical fault
injection results show significant (from 40% to 20%) reduction in failure rate, the
question, however, is whether this reduction is real or just a false conclusion.
Intuitively, it is clear that the correct interpretation of SFI results should demon-
strate exactly the same amount of failures for both original and FT version of the
program. In this work, we use Pprobability of Filure (PoF) as a comparison metric
that can be calculated by involving the execution time overhead of the FT version
in two ways; a) adjusting the number of fault injection experiments according to the
execution time overhead and just comparing the absolute number of failures not per-
centage. For example, injecting 20 random faults instead of 10 random faults of the
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FT version of the program in the above example should get us 4 failures, which is
exactly equal to the number of failures of the original program. b) Multiplying the
number/percentage of failures into the execution time overhead. For example, for FT
version of the program in the example above, we can use 20% * 2 = 40%, which is
equal to the original program failure rate.
In addition, as pinpointed by (Schirmeier et al., 2015), showing the number or
percentage of detected or masked fault is also misleading. For instance, in our simple
example, injecting 10 faults in FT version of the program would lead to 80% masked
faults, which in comparison with the original program fault injection is 20% more.
However, this fault masking improvement is the result of faults which are injected
into the program-irrelevant parts of the execution of the program. Similar to NOPs,
in the imaginary FT version of the above example, redundant instructions in the
in-thread duplication FT schemes are also irrelevant to the main program. Faults
that affect these original program irrelevant parts will result in either masked or de-
tected/SegFault and should not be considered as the fault detection ability of the FT
method.
In conclusion, since comparing the absolute or percentage of SDCs of original and
protected versions of the program can result in an overestimation of the effectiveness
of the software fault tolerance techniques, in this paper we use the PoF metric which
was calculated as follow:
PoF = Percentage of SDCs× execution time overhead (2.1)
For the original version of the programs, the execution time overhead is considered
as 1; therefore, the PoF is equal to the percentage of SDCs. For protected versions
of the program, the execution time overhead is calculated as the protected program
execution time divided by the original program execution time.
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2.5.1 Experimental Results
Error Coverage
Graphs in Figure 2.7 present the PoF for each hardware component. In each graph,
the PoF is plotted on the Y-axis for each benchmark on the X-axis. We study the
PoF for original, SWIFT and nZDC versions of the benchmarks for the following
components:
Figure 2.7(a) presents the FP extracted from fault injection experiments on LSQ.
For the LSQ, although the FP is 3.4% for the original program, but it actually
increases to 3.9% for SWIFT. As mentioned in section 2.4, SWIFT does not protect
the loads and stores - they are executed only once. Therefore the LSQ is vulnerable.
However, we observe that it is actually more vulnerable than the original program.
This is because to implement SWIFT, we need to reserve half of the registers in
the processor, and that increases the register pressure and increases the spill code -
causing a spike in the number of load and store instructions. This leads to an increase
in the number of entires in the LSQ, and therefore the probability that a fault will
cause an error/failure. nZDC has 0% failure. nZDC is effective, since it protects loads
by duplicating them, and protects the stores by reading the stored value again and
checking it against the duplicate.
The result of fault injection on FUs is shown in Figure 2.7 (b). For FUs, the
average FP for original and SWIFT versions of the programs are 9.8% and 1.7%,
respectively. We explored the failure experiments in SWIFT, and discovered almost
all of them are the result of faults affecting the FU while computing effective address
of memory instructions. As expected, Zero SDC for programs protected with nZDC
mechanism is observed.
Figure 2.7(c) presents the FP extracted from fault injection trails on pipeline reg-
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Figure 2.7: Component wise probability of failure for Original, SWIFT-protected
and nZDC-protected programs
isters. As it shows, nZDC reduces the FP of the original program by about 55X to
fairly close to zero, and SWIFT reduces pipeline registers FP by about 11X. In con-
trary with what we expect, the FP for nZDC in not absolutely zero. This discrepancy
is not a deficiency of our technique, but has its roots in our evaluation methodology.
We analyzed the failures, and found that the reason is because of working with un-
modified library calls. The soft error happens on the destination register pointer part
of a checking instruction before a library call, and the fault changed the destination
register from register Zero to the register X1, which was already checked. As a result
the argument value of the library function call was wrong and it produces a SDCs.
These errors would not happen when all code, including libraries is treated by nZDC.
Figure 2.7(d) displays the FP for register file, which on average for Original,
SWIFT and nZDC is about 10.3%, 0.1% and 0.0%, respectively. Our fault injection
results on register file is in accordance with previous works (Reis et al., 2005; Feng
et al., 2010; Mitropoulou et al., 2013b) which show almost near zero SDC for SWIFT.
32
Figure 2.8: Fault injection results on CF instruction
However, because of the register file vulnerable periods (marked by vertical lines in
figure 2.1), there is always a chance of SDC caused by soft error in the register file. On
the other hand, since nZDC can completely close the register file vulnerable intervals
by performing checking instructions after memory write instructions instead of before
them, the PoF is Zero.
Figure 2.8 shows the results of fault injection on the branch address and com-
pare instructions of the programs to examine the efficacy of the nZDC control flow
mechanism. In these experiments we randomly inject faults on the original com-
pare and branch instructions (excluding checking instructions) while in pipeline reg-
ister, and conditional registers. Since the target of fault injection has been se-
lected among the program original instructions, in Figure 2.8 we show the amount
of Masked, Detected/SegFault and SDCs. The Detected/SegFault portion of the
stacked bars demonstrate the percentage of injected faults which are either detected
by SWIFT/nZDC or by OS as segmentation fault.
As figure 2.8 demonstrates original and SWIFT are almost identical in failure rate,
about 18% SDCs! This is because, SWIFT CFC can just only detect wrong direct
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Figure 2.9: Execution time overhead for SWIFT and nZDC
branches to the beginning of a basic block not to the middle. Overall, the SWIFT
CF mechanism is not effective, however, nZDC CF mechanism detects about 55% of
faults and just 0.4% of faults lead to SDCs.
Performance evaluation
Figure 2.9 presents the results of performance overhead of nZDC and SWIFT for an
in-order ARM processor with the configuration shown in table 2.2. On average, the
execution time overhead for nZDC and SWIFT is about 224% and 213%. Performance
overhead is higher than similar works, and it happened because of an inaccuracy that
some of previous works have in their performance measurement. For instance, research
(Feng et al., 2010) assumed that library functions are protected by other means, but
they do not consider the performance overhead of the library function protection,
and, since a program can spend a considerably large amount of its execution time
in the library calls (CRC benchmark spends more than 90% of its execution time
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inside library calls), this leads to performance overhead underestimation. However,
in this work, for performance overhead evaluation, we just consider the cycles that a
program spends in user functions.
2.6 Summary
The significant amount of non-replicated operations in the existing software-level
soft error mitigation schemes significantly restricts their error coverage. This chapter
proposed nZDC error detection scheme which either duplicates program operations
or verifies their executions with advanced control-flow checking and store checking
mechanism. Statistical µarchitectural error injection experiments show significant
error detection improvements.
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Chapter 3
BACKWARD RECOVERY1
“Organization of redundancy and fault-tolerance for ultra-high reliability is a chal-
lenging problem: redundancy management can account for half the software in a flight
control system and, if less than perfect can itself become the primary source of system
failure (Owre et al., 1995).”
3.1 Overview
An ideal solution for soft error resilience should mask the effect of soft errors
from user and provide correct results at expected time. Many of the software-level
fault tolerance techniques are incomplete, because they provide error detection and
assume some sort of checkpoint/roll-back for recovery. Restarting a program from
beginning is the simplest rollback recovery strategy. However, re-starting is not appli-
cable in many cases, i.e, long running, real-time and interactive applications (Zhang
and Chakrabarty, 2003), and even if possible it accompanies a high error recovery
latency – expected recovery latency is half of the program execution time. These
problems can be alleviated by building full-system checkpoints (preserving the whole
memory and register stats) during the execution of a program (Duell, 2005; Lu et al.,
2013). However, to solve the problem of latent errors (errors which may happen be-
fore checkpointing and will be detected after checkpointing) frequent checkpoints are
required, which impose unacceptable performance overhead to the system (Elnozahy
and Plank, 2004; Schroeder and Gibson, 2007; Aupy et al., 2013).
1This chapter is an enhancement of a published papers, Didehban, Moslem, Sai Ram Dheeraj
Lokam, and Aviral Shrivastava. “InCheck: An in-application recovery scheme for soft errors.”
Design Automation Conference (DAC), 2017 54th ACM/EDAC/IEEE, 2017. The publisher permits
authors to include partial or complete papers of their own in a dissertation.
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In-application fault tolerant techniques can potentially eliminate the need for full-
system checkpointing and memory replication, while providing efficient and timely
error handling by combining both error detection and recovery within the application
itself. Unfortunately, the existing in-application error tolerant schemes are signifi-
cantly weaker (in terms of error coverage) than corresponding error detection only
schemes due to the vulnerabilities added by their complex (and unprotected) error
recovery routines. For instance, SWIFTR (Reis et al., 2007) was proposed to provide
error recovery to SWIFT (an error-detection only technique described in section 2.2)
(Reis et al., 2005) by adopting forward recovery strategy. SWIFT-R divides program-
mer available registers into 3 redundant sets, executes 3 versions of each computa-
tional instruction and performs majority-voting between register operands of mem-
ory and control-flow instructions before their execution. Surprisingly, our analysis of
SWIFTR-protected programs reveals that they suffer from ∼16x less error coverage
than SWIFT-protected programs! This is because: i) SWIFTR-protected programs
include considerably more unprotected memory instructions than SWIFT-protected
programs due to high register pressure imposed by register reserving required for re-
dundant computations, ii) SWIFT-R has software vulnerability windows larger than
SWIFT, as it replaces light (in terms of machine instructions) error detection checks
of SWIFT with heavier voting operations, and (iii) SWIFTR offers unsafe recovery
by blindly masking the effect of certain errors on registers that may have already
propagated to memory or may even have altered the program control-flow.
Realizing the above-mentioned limitations of SWIFTR, we build upon our pro-
posed nZDC error detection scheme (explained in Chapter 2) and introduce an ef-
fective error detection and recovery scheme. Our solution, named InCheck (In-
application Checkpointing and Recovery), is a software-only scheme for complete,
safe & timely recovery from soft errors. InCheck makes light-weight error-free check-
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points at basic block granularity, and safely reverts the program execution to the
beginning of last executed basic block using preserved checkpoints. The main fea-
tures of InCheck are:
i) Verified Register File Preservation. InCheck transformation not only
preserves registers value into memory (no latent error), but also makes sure that the
preserving process is performed correctly.
ii) Single Memory-location Checkpointing. Rather than checkpointing the
whole memory state, InCheck temporarily preserves the state of each memory location
before the corresponding writes to those locations.
iii) Safe & Timely recovery. Instead of performing recovery regardless of the
error propagation scope, InCheck invokes a diagnosis routine which allows recovery
only when its safe. The recovery latency of InCheck is negligible as it involves re-
execution of just one basic-block’s instructions apart from diagnosis and recovery
routines.
3.2 Limitations of Related Work
Traditionally Checkpointing/rollback has been used a recovery strategy in High
Performance Computing (HPC) systems. The program execution in such systems
is periodically paused to save checkpoints (snapshots of the entire program state
including memory footprint and register values) into a safe storage. In case of an
error, program execution is resumed from the the latest checkpoint (Duell, 2005).
Applying full system checkpointing/rollback as error recovery in embedded criti-
cal applications in not efficient because of: i) Significant recovery latency (millions or
billion of instructions depends on the checkpointing interval), ii) Unacceptable perfor-
mance overhead (frequent checkpointing is required for latent error recovery (Aupy
et al., 2013)) and iii) Need of extra safe storage (∼ 0.5-1 Giga bytes per checkpoint).
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In fact, this huge overhead of frequent and multiple checkpoints (required for suc-
cessful and fast recovery from silent errors) has restricted the usage of such recovery
techniques to HPC systems alone (Elnozahy and Plank, 2004; Schroeder and Gibson,
2007).
To overcome the limitations of full checkpointing, techniques like Encore (Feng
et al., 2011), Clover (Liu et al., 2015) and FASER (Xu et al., 2013) propose fast
and low-overhead recovery schemes by taking advantage of the idempotent regions
of the program codes. Idempotent segments of a code do not have any Write after
Read (WAR) dependencies. Therefore, multiple re-executions of such region always
produces same result after execution. Nevertheless, idempotent-based recovery tech-
niques have been designed for non-critical applications and have narrow fault cover-
age. For instance, as mentioned in Encore paper (Feng et al., 2011), faults which
cause a write into the wrong memory address or control flow errors (a fairly large
amount of errors) cannot be recovered even if they occur in idempotent region of
code. Hence, the ineffectiveness of idempotent-based recovery schemes makes such
solutions unsuitable for critical applications.
3.2.1 Coarse-Grain Forward Recovery
Forward recovery schemes which are based on the triplication and voting strat-
egy, eliminate the need for checkpointing and can provide timely recovery. Forward-
recovery can take place at coarse-grained (like process/task/thread replication) or
fine-grained (assembly-level instruction replication) modular redundancy. State-of-
the-art coarse-grained techniques like PLR (Process-level Redundancy (Shye et al.,
2009)) apply redundancy at process-level, and perform voting between the redundantly-
computed system call arguments at system-call boundaries. However, since errors
may affect a program without manifesting themselves in system call arguments, PLR
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approach is not effective for critical applications. For instance, if a system call (like
fwrite) takes a memory pointer and size as arguments, there can be errors in the
actual data referenced by the pointer even if the arguments (redundantly computed
pointers and size) are equal. In addition, software voting operations and the execution
of system call themselves are the single-points-of-failures in such techniques.
3.2.2 Fine-Grained Recovery
Fine-grained assembly-level techniques (Reis et al., 2007, 2005; Oh et al., 2002a;
Didehban and Shrivastava, 2016; Mitropoulou et al., 2013b; Xu et al., 2013; Yu et al.,
2009; Wang et al., 2007) are the most related techniques to the work presented in this
chapter. They are very popular as they can potentially provide high degree of relia-
bility. This is because such techniques are implemented as machine-level instructions,
and have the ability to effectively check for the errors which may cause a failure, i.e, in
memory operations and control flow direction. Unfortunately, existing complete fine-
grained techniques, SWIFTR (Reis et al., 2007) and FASER (Xu et al., 2013), suffer
from significantly higher failure rate that the fined-grained error detection schemes.
SWIFTR: Unsafe Recovery
The idea of providing the error detection and recovery at assembly-level was intro-
duced in SWIFTR (Reis et al., 2007) research paper. SWIFTR (SWIFT+Recovery)
is developed based on the well-known SWIFT (Reis et al., 2005) error detection only
technique. It executes three versions of program’s computational instructions with
different sets of registers and performs 2-of-3 majority-voting between redundant reg-
isters values before memory and control-flow instructions to mask the effect of error
from computations. However, SWIFTR transformation not only imposes significant
performance overhead, it also increases SWIFT failure rate due to following reasons:
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1) SWIFTR transformation results in considerably more unprotected
instructions than SWIFT. SWIFTR requires about two thirds (∼66%) of pro-
grammer available registers for error recovery, while SWIFT reserves about half of
registers for error detection. This extra register preservation forces compiler to gen-
erate more memory instructions which are single-point-of-failure in SWIFT-based
transformation (Didehban and Shrivastava, 2016). To quantify the effect of register
reservation on programs, we compiled Mibench (Guthaus et al., 2001) programs with
LLVM 3.7 (Lattner and Adve, 2004) infrastructure for ARMv8-A architecture which
has 32 general purpose integer registers. 2 We found out that SWIFTR imposes
more than 4x memory operations compared to SWIFT. Note that, FASER (Xu et al.,
2013), a SWIFT-based backward-recovery, also shares this problem with SWIFTR.
2) SWIFTR suffers from considerably larger software vulnerability win-
dow than SWIFT. SWIFTR increases software vulnerability window (interval be-
tween value checking and actual usage of that value) of SWIFT, because it replaces
light error-detectors (1-2 machine instructions), with expensive majority-voting op-
erations (8-10 machine instructions). Figure 3.1 illustrates the software vulnerable
window of SWIFT and SWIFTR transformations for a simple memory write oper-
ation. SWIFT just checks the stores value (r1) and address (r2) registers, against
their shadows (r1* and r2*) before the actual memory write instructions. Therefore,
there is a small interval between the checking and using of register values. If an error
happens in the register during this interval, error may remain undetected. SWIFTR
transformation, on the other hand, requires performing majority-voting operations
between redundant registers that are used for stores value (r1, r1* and r1**) and
address (r2, r2* and r2**) operands. Since the software implementation of the 2-of-3
2Implementation of SWIFTR and FASER on an ARMv7 microprocessor is problematic (if not
possible) because only 16 user visible registers are available.
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if ( r1 != r1
*) error
store r1  [r2]
if ((r1 != r1
*) || (r1 != r1
**) || (r1
* != r1
**))
if (r1 == r1
*) r1
** = r1
else if (r1
* == r1
**) r1 = r1
*
else if (r1 == r1
**) r1
* = r1
store r1  [r2]
if ((r2 != r2
*) || (r2 != r2
**) || (r2
* != r2
**))
if (r2 == r2
*) r2
** = r2
else if (r2
* == r2
**) r2 = r2
*
else if (r2 == r2
**) r2
* = r2
if ( r2 != r2
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Figure 3.1: SWIFTR (part b) software vulnerability interval is considerably more
than SWIFT (part a)
majority-voting needs more machine instructions than just error checking, software
vulnerable intervals of SWIFTR is longer than SWIFT. As SWIFTR demands more
memory (therefore voting) operations, the number of these software vulnerability
intervals are considerably more than those in SWIFT. Note that these software vul-
nerability intervals are considerable because they exist before all memory, control-flow
and function call instructions.
3) SWIFTR unsafe recovery eliminates the effect of error on registers
even though memory or control flow is faulty. If an error happens during
SWIFT vulnerability window, it probably corrupts the memory state and/or alters
the program control-flow. SWIFT can still detect such errors, if the mismatch between
redundant registers reaches to the successive error detectors. However, since SWIFTR
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Figure 3.2: SWIFTR protected programs experience more than 16x failure than
SWIFT-protected ones!
and FASER recovery schemes, try to blindly recover from any discrepancy (without
determining the scope of error propagation), they can mask the effect of error in
registers while the memory state or the program control flow is erroneous.
In order to quantify SWIFTR negative impacts on failure rate, we performed 54k
fault injection experiments on register file of a simulated microprocessor while running
SWIFT and SWIFTR protected programs. The details of the simulator configuration
and fault injection set up are presented in section 3.4. Figure 3.2 demonstrates the
results of fault injection experiments. As it can be seen, SWIFTR transformation
caused ∼16x more failure (SDC) than previous error detection version!
3.3 InCheck: Our Proposed Fine-grained Backward Recovery Solution
In this section, we propose a safe and timely recovery scheme which in combina-
tion with nZDC (explained in Section 2.4) as the underlying error detection scheme,
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will serve as a complete, safe and timely error handling strategy. InCheck error han-
dling process can be divided into two main parts: DF (Data-Flow) and CF (Control-
Flow) error recovery. DF error recovery (shown in Figure 3.3) consists of four main
steps: 1) Verified Register Preservation. It takes place at the beginning of each basic
block and stores the value of live registers into the checkpointing area of memory.
InCheck makes sure that no error can cross the preservation phase by checking the
process of preservation itself in-addition to checking the reserved register values. 2)
Single Memory-location checkpointing. Right before each store instruction, InCheck
preserves the data presented in about-to-be-updated memory location to a specific
register. This register will further be used for memory restoration in the case of er-
rors. 3) Checks for Safe Recovery. InCheck diagnosis routine checks if the error is
recoverable. This is necessary because safe recovery is not possible in some cases. For
instance, errors which cause a write into a memory location different from the one
that the backup load reads from cannot be recovered because the backup itself is not
valid. 4) Timely Recovery. The program execution is resumed from the beginning of
basic block after the Memory and Register file state is restored to fault-free state that
was present at the beginning of that basic block. Timely recovery is possible since
the overall operations needed for diagnosis and recovery are implemented within 100
instructions.
Control-flow error recovery is similar to DF error recovery, however, the challenge
is to determine from where the program re-execution should be restarted. InCheck
CF diagnosis routine separates wrong-direction (errors which alter the direction of
branch) CF errors from wrong-target ones(errors which cause an illegal jump), and
provides recovery for the former and safe-stop for latter.
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Figure 3.3: InCheck data-flow error recovery Overview
3.3.1 Verified Register File Preservation
InCheck saves the values of live registers into a designated memory location called
register preservation area at the entrance of each basic block. Error-free registers
should only be preserved and the preservation process itself should be error-free to
prevent failures. InCheck validates the correctness of preservation process by applying
checking-load strategy introduced in Chapter 2 Section 2.4 – It loads back the saved
register value from the register preservation area and checks that against its shadow
register. Note that the program counter register (PC) is always considered as live and
gets preserved. The PC preservation is crucial for recovery from control-flow errors
(described in section 3.3.5) detected in fan-in basic blocks that potentially contain
multiple re-execution points.
45
3.3.2 Single Memory-Location Checkpointing
InCheck introduces a novel and efficient method for memory checkpointing. Rather
than saving the entire memory state or being rely on idempotent regions of code (Feng
et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2013), it just backs-up the memory location
which is about to be updated to facilitate safe recovery. Since memory subsystem
can be protected by ECC, it is intuitive to avoid saving the whole memory state.
However, ECC is ineffective if memory write operation data or address is faulty.
Therefore, the previous value of about-to-be-updated memory location is needed for
memory restoration.
InCheck provides memory checkpointing by inserting a load instruction (back-up
load) from the exact address as the following memory write instruction into an specific
register, named MBR (Memory Back-up Register). InCheck transformation forces
compiler to break down basic blocks with potentially conflicting memory operations
(multiple write and read operations from the same memory location) into sub basic
blocks without such memory dependencies. This basic block purification is required
for recovery from basic blocks with conflicting memory operations, because InCheck
on-the-fly single memory location checkpointing strategy just provide backup for one
memory location.
3.3.3 Checks for Safe Recovery
One of the features of InCheck that distinguishes it from its related techniques is
its diagnosis routine that’s essential for safe recovery. Basically, if error affects the
execution of redundant computations or error detection instructions (shown is Figure
3.3) the error is always recoverable. Since the data will be written into an unknown
(unbacked-up) memory location, if error impacts the execution of store instruction
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in such a way that the effective memory address gets modified, the error should be
considered as unrecoverable.
Figure 4.4 shows an example of InCheck data-flow error detection and diagnosis.
The first load (left side of the Figure, before store) is the “back-up load” which
performs on-demand memory checkpointing. The error detection takes place after
the store instruction, and program control goes to diagnosis routine in the case of
a mismatch. Firstly, diagnosis routine checks for errors in the computation of store
value register (r1). If a mismatch is observed, the error is flagged to be recoverable.
The program flow then jumps to the recovery routine (not shown in Figure). Secondly,
diagnosis routine checks for mismatch from the store address register. Depending
on the time of error occurrence, it may or may not be recoverable. If error occurs
on address register r2 before the back-up load, the error is flagged to be recoverable.
In this case, the back-up for wrongly updated memory is available and thus memory
restoration is possible. However, if the error happens after the execution of back-up
load, the recovery is not possible since the value of MBR is not the same as previously
updated wrong memory value. To determine the time of occurrence of error, diagnosis
routine loads the data back from the memory location with the same address as store
into a temporary register (temp) and compares that against store value register (r1).
If they match, it assumes that error has modified the address of both back-up load and
the store in the same way (back-up is valid) deems it recoverable. In the third step,
diagnosis routine compares the value of MBR to temp. If different, it implies that the
store has written incorrect data into right memory location. This type of error is
also recoverable because memory back-up is valid. In the fourth step, diagnosis checks
for errors on detection instructions which are just false alarms and easily recoverable.
False alarms can be checked by repeating the error detection instructions. Ultimately,
if none of the above situation were true, the diagnosis routine declares the error as
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load MBR [r2]
store r1 [r2]
load  temp  [r2
*]
if (r1
* != temp ) 
Go to Diagnosis
If (r1 != r1*) 
Recoverable; // faulty value reg. 
Data Flow Diagnosis Steps
load  temp [r2
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If (r1
* == temp )
Recoverable; // false alarm
load  temp [r2]
If ((r1 == temp) && (r2 != r2
*)) 
Recoverable; // faulty address reg.
If (MBR !=  temp) 
Recoverable; // faulty written data 
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Figure 3.4: An example of InCheck data-flow diagnosis
detected/Unrecoverable and terminates program execution.
3.3.4 Timely Recovery
In the last phase of InCheck error handling, the actual recovery takes place by
performing memory and register file restoration and re-executing the program from
the beginning of the basic block. First, the memory state will be restored to the
same state as before the write instruction. This is done by writing the MBR register
into the memory write target location. Error-free live registers will then be loaded
back from the register preservation area to the corresponding registers. Finally, the
main program execution is resumed. Since the first two steps of InCheck (safe register
preservation and memory checkpointing) should be executed in all (erroneous or error-
free) cases, the recovery latency of InCheck is equal to the execution time of diagnosis
and recovery routines and replicated instructions (instructions from the beginning of
basic-block till the error detection point). Since the diagnosis, recovery routines
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and the average basic block size are small, the overall recovery latency is practically
negligible.
3.3.5 Control-Flow Error Recovery
InCheck employs nZDC control-flow (CF) checking mechanism (explained in Sec-
tion 2.4), but in addition to nZDC CF error detection checks (positioned close to
the end of each basic block) it also performs error detection checks at the beginning
of each basic block (before safe register preservation). If a CF error gets detected
by the first checks, InCheck invokes the corresponding CF-specific diagnosis routine.
These routines are different from DF diagnosis routine (described in section 3.3.3),
and their responsibility is to determine if the detected CF error is a wrong-direction or
a wrong-target error. A control-flow error will be considered as wrong-direction error,
if the last preserved PC is in the list of predecessors of the current basic block. If that
is the case, error will be treated as recoverable and recovery takes place by restoring
memory and register values to the initial state of the previously executed basic blocks.
Otherwise, the error will be considered as wrong-target CF error and errors which are
detected by nZDC CF error detectors (positioned at the end of basic block) will be
considered as unrecoverable – diagnosis routine terminates the execution of program.
Fortunately, as (Shrivastava et al., 2014) demonstrated, most of control-flow errors
are wrong-direction errors and are therefore recoverable by InCheck error handling
scheme.
3.4 Experimental Methodology
To quantify the effectiveness of InCheck, we implemented InCheck and SWIFTR
(as the the-state-of-the-art related work) techniques as late back-end passes in LLVM
3.7 infrastructure (Lattner and Adve, 2004) for an ARMv8-a ISA (64-bit architec-
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ture). We compiled 9 programs from Mibench benchmark suite (Guthaus et al.,
2001) with -O3 compiler optimization flag. For each program three versions (Origi-
nal, InCheck and SWIFTR) were produced. It should be noted that all experiments
and results were performed on user functions (library functions and system calls were
excluded).
We performed extensive fault injection experiments on major sequential hardware
components of a modern ARM cortex A-53 like simulated microprocessor. Experi-
ments were performed on gem5 (Binkert et al., 2011), a cycle accurate µarchitectural-
level simulator with the configuration shown in Table 2.2. We performed single bit-flip
fault injection experiments on major core components including, integer register file,
issue and decode pipeline registers, functional units and load-store unit buffer reg-
isters. For each component 2000 faults were injected per version of program, which
means 72,000 (4 * 2000 * 9) faults per each program version – overall 216,000 (72k *
3) faults. For each fault injection experiment, a target component and a (bit, cycle)
were randomly selected before the simulation run. Once the simulator reaches the
target fault injection cycle, simulation is paused and the selected bit is inverted. The
simulation then resumes with the faulty value until it gets terminated or reaches the
allowed simulation time (3x of normal execution time). The result of each simulation
run is classified as one of the following:
1) Masked: Program terminates normally and the output is correct.
2) Failed/SDC: Program terminates, but the output is incorrect.
3) Detected/Unrecoverable: This outcome occur just in InCheck protected pro-
grams, and happens when an error is detected, but cannot be recovered from.
4) Others: Program encounters a fatal error, such as segmentation fault or simula-
tion time reaches its limit.
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Figure 3.5: SDCs Distribution in Component-wise Fault Injection Experiments
3.5 Experimental Results
3.5.1 Error Coverage
Figure 4.7 depicts the absolute number (in logarithmic scale) of failures (SDCs)
per hardware component. We did not use fault coverage metric, because it can be
misleading (Schirmeier et al., 2015)). Regardless of the target fault injection com-
ponent, InCheck-protected programs never resulted in a failure! This implies that
1) No error could skip InCheck+nZDC error detectors, 2) The diagnosis routine al-
ways distinguishes recoverable errors from unrecoverable ones accurately, and 3) If
the detected error was recognized as recoverable, the recovery routine is always suc-
cessful. InCheck is extremely effective as it protects functionally-related instructions
of the program as well as error handling (preservation and checkpointing) operations.
However, in comparison to original programs, SWIFTR transformation reduces the
overall failure count by 4.3x (5.2x, 2.9x, 8x and 4x for pipeline registers, register file,
functional units and load-store unit, respectively). Our investigation from failed ex-
periments reveals that SWIFTR provides correct recovery only from the faults which
affect the computational instructions, and the rest of the faults either get masked by
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the programs or lead to failures or segmentation faults.
InCheck-protected programs can potentially recover from Soft Errors which lead
to segmentation faults if their diagnosis routines initialize at the beginning of signal
handler functions of applications. Since in gem5 system call emulation mode, the
simulator terminates the program execution without forwarding segmentation fault
signals to the application, the results shown here do not fully demonstrate the InCheck
recoverability.
InCheck Diagnosis routine declared around 96% of detected faults as recoverable.
In less than 4% of the cases, diagnosis routine provided safe-stop and prevented failure
by terminating the program. If left unterminated, these unrecoverable faults could
have either directly impacted the execution of a memory write operation or caused an
unexpected jump in the program. Restarting can anyways be employed as recovery
strategy in these scenarios.
3.5.2 Performance Overhead
Figure 3.6 shows the execution overheads of InCheck+nZDC and SWIFT-R pro-
tected programs normalized to Original Program. It can be seen that on an average,
an InCheck version of a program can run 36% faster than its SWIFTR equivalent.
InCheck is faster because it pushes the uncommon diagnosis and recovery routines
off the critical-path of execution. The performance overhead of frequent live register
preservation is acceptable, because the corresponding memory preservation locations
are usually presented in the cache and will therefore execute fast. Furthermore, the
performance overhead of back-up loads (inserted right before program store instruc-
tions) are also not significant, because they do not cause any more memory misses
– if the data is not in the cache, miss is inevitable. If not by back-up load, it will
eventually happen by store instruction itself.
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Figure 3.6: Execution Overhead of SWIFT-R & InCheck
To quantify the recovery-latency of InCheck, we counted the average number
of extra instructions which were executed when an injected fault was detected and
recovered. On an average, the InCheck recovery spans for 180 dynamic instructions.
This latency is unnoticeable in most cases.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter we present InCheck, as an in-application soft Error detection,
diagnosis and recovery scheme. InCheck protects the execution of resilince-related
routines like checkpointing operations as well as main program instructions. InCheck
uses verified register file preservation and single-memory-location checkpointing. We
also performed diagnosis after error detection to provide safe recovery. Fault injec-
tion experiments demonstrate that InCheck offers quicker and better error recovery
compared to the state-of-the-art approaches.
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Chapter 4
FORWARD RECOVERY1
This chapter presents NEMESIS a compiler-level fine-grained soft error resilience
technique that enables computation even in the presence of soft errors by adopting
a forward error recovery scheme. It replaces computationally expensive software
majority-voting routines with cheap error detectors. On detecting an error, diagnosis
and recovery routines allow for quick recovery, and continued error-free execution
with a reasonable performance overhead.
4.1 NEMESIS: Overview
NEMESIS is a set of compiler transformations which provide a soft error hardened
code by adding redundancy and reforming control flow of the original code. NEME-
SIS partitions programmer-available machine registers into three sets, called M-regs
(Master Registers), D-regs (Detection Registers) and R-regs (Recovery Registers),
and runs three independent sequences of instructions, named M-stream, D-stream,
and R-stream. The M-stream has all instructions needed for functionally correct
execution of a program. D-stream is a redundant copy of M-stream which does not
include any memory write and functional call instructions, however, it does include all
arithmetic, memory read, compare and branch instructions. R-stream just contains
arithmetic and memory read instructions – register-modifying instructions. This is
because that R-stream results only will be used in majority-voting to mask the effect
of the errors from the general purpose register file. In addition to these three redun-
1This chapter is an enhancement of a published papers, Didehban, Moslem, Aviral Shrivastava,
and Sai Ram Dheeraj Lokam “NEMESIS: A software approach for computing in presence of soft
errors.” Computer-Aided Design (ICCAD), 2017 IEEE/ACM. Publisher permits authors to include
partial or complete papers of their own in a dissertation.
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dant streams, a NEMESIS-protected program includes error detection, diagnosis and
recovery instructions. NEMESIS assumes ECC-protected caches and memory, and
its sphere-of-protection includes the entire microprocessor core (excluding memory
subsystem). The objective of NEMESIS is to detect and correct the effect of all tran-
sient faults which may lead to SDC or timing failures. These errors are the hardest
to detect and correct because they usually do not generate any visible symptoms like
exceptions, segmentation faults (Wang and Patel, 2006) and not easily detectable by
low-cost symptom-based error detection techniques. The salient points of NEMESIS,
and why it is effective are mentioned below:
i) NEMESIS protects the execution of all (critical and noncritical) instruc-
tions: This is the main philosophical difference between SWIFTR (most related work
explained in Section 3.2.2) and NEMESIS. SWIFTR tries to mask the impact of error
from register operands of critical instructions, but it does not check the execution of
critical instructions themselves. NEMESIS, on the other hand, verifies the execution
of all programs instructions by making sure than the program executes the right store
instructions, correctly. NEMESIS achieves that by checking the outcome of program
branch and memory write instructions. In the case of any discrepancy, NEMESIS
calls a diagnosis routine and then attempts to recover from the error. For store
instructions, error detector verifies if the stored value is correctly written into the
correct memory location by loading back the stored data and checking that against
the D-stream computed store value. For branch instructions, direction check takes
place by executing the corresponding D-stream compare and branch instruction, and
verifying the destination basic block. Nevertheless, if the presence of any error is
detected, a diagnosis routine will get invoked and determines the scope of error in
the program. If the error is diagnosed as recoverable (marked as 1 in Figure 4.1),
the effect of error from the register file and memory is eliminated, then the recovery
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routine re-executes the corresponding critical instruction and the program execution
resumes. Otherwise, if the diagnosis routine declares the presence of an unrecoverable
error(marked as 2 in Figure 4.1), the program execution will be terminated.
ii) NEMESIS transformations leaves no software vulnerability window:
Software vulnerability window, defined as the duration between checking a value in
software and the time to use the value, exist in almost all existing software-level
techniques. This interval can be a major source of failure especially for Voting-
based techniques. Software voting, not only has vulnerable periods, but also imposes
considerable performance overhead. Instead of voting, NEMESIS just checks for
errors in the results of critical instructions. Since this checking will take place after
the execution of store instructions, NEMESIS needs to preserve the value inside each
memory location before write, for recovery purposes. This strategy eliminates the
software vulnerability window – no unprotected interval between value checking and
usage. If there is no error, then the execution proceeds. Otherwise, diagnosis routine
decides about the faith of program. If error considered as recoverable, the recovery
scheme uses a voting mechanism and memory preserved data to eliminate the impact
of errors from register file and memory. Note that since the execution of post-error
handling routines is rare (just in the case of error), they usually do not have much
impact on the performance.
4.2 NEMESIS: Details
4.2.1 Memory write operation error detectors
NEMESIS utilizes the load-backing data flow error detection strategy of nZDC-
based protection schemes (Didehban and Shrivastava, 2016; Didehban et al., 2017a).
It detects errors on memory write instructions by loading back the written value
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Figure 4.1: NEMESIS data-flow error handling strategy. After each store instruc-
tion, the Error detector unit checks for errors, and if any observed, the diagnosis
routine will get involved and classifies the error as either Recoverable or Detected/not-
recoverable. If an error is recoverable, memory and register restoration will take place
and program continues with executing the store instruction. Otherwise, the program
stops the execution by raising an error flag.
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from the memory and comparing it against corresponding D-stream computed value.
However, such post-store error detection strategy cannot detect errors affecting the
address of silent stores and in this section we present our solution for such undetected
errors.
Silent store vulnerable window. By definition, a store is said to be silent if it
writes a value into a memory element which is already holding the same value (Bell
et al., 2000; Lepak et al., 2001). If an error affects the execution of a silent store, i.e,
alters stores effective address, the write operation can make a random modification to
the state of memory and the error cannot be detected by load back strategy because
the loaded value from the memory is as same as the stored vale.
Figure 4.2 exemplifies an undetected error case in store-loadback strategy. As
it shows, the store is silent because the value in memory location addr, val, before
executing store instruction (upper part of fig.4.2) is equal to the values which are
computed by main and detection streams, valM and valD, respectively. Therefore,
the state of memory should not get changed by the execution of store instruction.
Now, assume that the soft error hits the base address register of the store, and alters
the store’s effective address from addr to f-addr. Consequently, the store writes its
data into the faulty memory address f-addr rather than addr, and changes the state
of memory while it is not supposed to do so(lower part of fig.4.2). This error remains
undetectable, since the following checking-load instruction will load the value, val,
from the correct address (computed by the detection stream), addrD, which is equal
to valM and valD. Note that simply inserting a check for the base address register
store wouldn’t solve the problem since the error can alter the store address without
affecting the address register, i.e, errors affecting functional unit or pipeline register
while processing the store instruction. Since silent stores can consist around 18% to
64% of total program’s store instructions (Bell et al., 2000), fixing the silent store
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vulnerability is important in critical applications.
First-cut solution for silent store vulnerable window. Since silent stores
do not alter the state of microprocessor, not executing such useless instructions will
eliminate their vulnerability without harming the correctness of program. Thus, an
obvious solution could be to jump over silent stores in the program. Figure 4.3(a)
illustrates the first cut attempt for eliminating the silent store problem from the
store-loadback error detection strategy. In the Figure redundantly computed values
of M-/D- and R-streams are differentiated by a superscript M, D or R letter. For
instance, valM , valD and valR denote redundantly-computed store’s value by M, D
and R streams, respectively. Initially in this scheme, a silent-check load (inst. 1)
reads back from exactly the same address that store is going to write into, and saves
the loaded value in an specific register, called Silent Check Register (SCR). Then,
SCR is compared against the M-stream computed store’s value, valM (inst. 2), to
determine if the store is silent. If the condition is true, the program jumps over
the store instruction, otherwise, store (inst. 3) will get executed and the following
checking-load (inst. 4) instruction reloads the store’s written value from the memory
into SCR register. In the end, regardless of the store being silent or not, the SCR
register should get checked against the value produced by D-stream, valD (inst. 5),
to make sure if store’s value,valM , was computed correctly.
NEMESIS solution for silent store vulnerable window. Although the
first-cut method solves the problem of silent stores, it introduces yet another possibly
undetected error scenario as the silent-check instructions (inst. 1, 2 in Figure 4.3(a))
themselves are unprotected. Therefore, if any error alters the effective address of a
silent-check load instruction in such a way that the wrongly loaded value is equal to
the store value, a non-silent store will be treated like a silent one, and memory state
would not get updated when it must. We named this type of errors as missing-memory
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Store  valM [f-addrM]
load    reg [addrD]
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?
Figure 4.2: Silent store undetected error scenario in checking load mechanism. Since
the store instruction is silent, writing into the wrong memory location error could not
get detected by checking load instruction.
update errors. These errors differ from Silent Store scenarios by a fact that the former
does not change the state of memory while it should, and the later updates the state
of memory while it should not. Note that similar to the silent-store problem, adding
one more checking instruction for the address register would not solve the problem,
since errors can alter the load address in data-path or load-store unite while the base
address register is error free.
NEMESIS error detection scheme counter-intuitively eliminates the problem of
silent-store vulnerability and missing-memory update by redundant and intertwined
execution of silent-check operations. This is best explained with pseudo code example
shown in Figure 4.3(b). Firstly, the value within the store destination memory
location is loaded back into two specific registers, VCR (Value Check Register) and
SCR (Silent Check Register) by two redundant load instructions (marked as inst 1
and 2 in part (b) of Figure 4.3) which use M- and D- stream’s redundantly-computed
registers as their address operands. Then in order to find out whether the store is
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Figure 4.3: Memory write instruction checking mechanisms. (a) The first-cut so-
lution which suffers from missing-memory update error and (b) NEMESIS mem-
ory write checking mechanism which solves the problem of silent-store and missing-
memory update.
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silent, the SCR register gets compared against the store value register computed by
M-stream, valM . If the store is identified as silent, the VCR register gets compared
against the store value register computed by D-stream (inst. 8) for error detection.
Since, the results of redundant silent-check loads are compared with the two M- and D-
stream computed store’s values, the missing-memory update error will get detected.
Now assume that the store is not silent, and store and checking-load (inst. (5) and
(6)) will get executed. Instruction (5) performs the actual memory write operation
and instruction (6) reloads the written value back to the VCR register. The VCR
register then gets compared against valD, which is the redundant copy of store value
computed by D-stream, for error detection purpose (inst. 8).
Since in NEMESIS transformation the effect of the error is detected after mem-
ory write instructions, it is necessary that a backup of about-to-be-written memory
location preserved before each store instruction. Fortunately, the previous state of
memory is already loaded to VCR register (inst. (1)). However, since this value will
be overwritten by the checking load instruction (inst. (6)) in the case of not-silent
stores, a copy of VCR is preserved in SCR register (inst. (4) and (7)).
4.2.2 Diagnosis/Recovery for Memory Write Errors
The main responsibility of NEMESIS diagnosis routine is to decide whether a
detected error is recoverable. A memory write detected error is considered as recov-
erable if the state of the register file and memory can revert to an error-free state
before the execution of store instruction. Generally, the effect of error from registers
can be masked by performing 2-of-3 majority-voting between corresponding M-, D-
and R- registers. And, the memory state can be rolled-back to an error-free sate by
writing back the backed-up data into the memory. However, there are two rare cases
in which NEMESIS diagnosis routine declares a detected error as not recoverable:
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load  x2
M, [x4
M]    
load  x2
D, [x4
D] 
load  x2
R, [x4
R] 
add   x1
M, x3
M, #4
add   x1
D, x3
D, #4 
add   x1
R, x3
R, #4
load  VCR, [x2
M]
load  SCR, [x2
R]
cmp SCR, x1
M
mov SCR, VCR
b.eq .Aftr-str
.Bfor-str: store x1
M, [x2
M]
load  VCR, [x2
D]
.Aftr-str:  cmp VCR, x1
D
b.ne .Diagnosis
.Diagnosis:
load VCR, [x2M] // will be used for backup check
// Unrecoverable: inter-stream error check
if ( (xM != xD) && (xM != xR) && (xD != xR) ) Unrecoverable 
// Recoverable: addr. register faulty and valid backup
if ( (x2
M != x2
R) && (VCR != SCR) ) Goto .Recovery
// Recoverable: Value register is faulty
if ( x1
M != x1
R ) Goto .Recovery
// Recoverable: just checking instructions are faulty
if ( VSR == x1
M ) Goto .Recovery
// Unrecoverable: unavailable backup
if (VCR == SCR ) Unrecoverable
.Recovery:
(1) Restore the state of memory
(2) Masking the effect of error from registers
(3) Program resumes by store re-execution
Silent store 
Check
Memory Backup 
preservation
Checking 
Load instruction
Error detection 
load  x2, [x4] 
add   x1, x3, #4
store x1, [x2]  
Original Code
Nemesis-Protected Code Diagnosis/Recovery Routines
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4.4: An example of NEMESIS memory write error detection, diagnosis, and
recovery. Part (a) shows the original code. Part (b) shows the Nemesis transformation
for error detection and recovery, the original instructions are distinguished from the
error management operations by being underlined. Part (c) shows NEMESIS off
performance-critical-path post error diagnosis and recovery routines.
Case 1: Inter-stream error propagation. If the effect of error has crossed
the boundary of redundant streams, it is possible that all three redundant-computed
registers contain different values, and, therefore, performing majority-voting cannot
mask the effect of the error. For example, consider an error on the decode stage
of the processor pipeline that alters the destination register pointer of an M-stream
instruction to a D-stream register which is going to be used as the operand for the
corresponding redundant D-stream instruction. In this case, the three corresponding
redundant registers will be holding different values, and, such an error can be detected
but is unrecoverable.
Case 2: Unavailable memory backup. If the memory write instruction mod-
ifies a different memory location from the preserved one, the error is unrecoverable.
Errors affecting store address register after the first silent-check load and before the
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store instruction (between inst. (1) and inst. (5) of part (b) of Figure 4.3), or error
altering the effective address of store instruction while it is processing in the processor
are deemed to be detected but unrecoverable errors.
If none of the above-mentioned cases are encountered, the diagnosis routine pro-
vokes the recovery block in which memory restoration takes place by writing the
backup data into the faulty written memory address, and then, followed by majority-
voting between registers. Once the effect of error gets eliminated from the memory
and the registers, a program can continue its error-free execution by retrying store
instruction.
4.2.3 Fault Coverage Analysis for Store Instructions
In order to clarify how NEMESIS memory error detection, diagnosis and recov-
ery work, in this section we explore the effect of some different errors on a sample
NEMESIS-protected code, presented in Figure 4.4. Note that the order of checks and
the structure of diagnosis and recovery blocks remain the same for different memory
write instructions, but the register numbers and labels need to be customized per
store instruction.
1) Error affects computation of store value register during the execution
of redundant streams. Assume that error happens during the execution of the
M-stream add instruction and the value saved in xM1 register becomes erroneous.
Depending on the effect of the error on the data within the xM1 register, two different
cases can happen: 1) Wrong value written to the correct memory location, or 2)
skipping a memory update by considering non-silent store as silent.
In the first case, in order to error propagates to the memory the erroneous value
in register xM1 has to be different from the data within the about-to-update memory
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location (saved in SCR), otherwise, the execution jumps over the store instruction.
In this case, the error will be discovered by NEMESIS error detection checks because
the loaded back value (saved in VCR register) will be different from the xD1 (the
D-stream computed version of xM1 ). In the diagnosis routine, we first load from
the store memory address into VCR register, which will be used for checking 1) the
(un)availability of memory backup and 2) the correctness of checking-load instruction.
Then, the diagnosis routine checks for inter-stream error propagation in store value
and address registers. Nevertheless, for this example, we assumed that the inter-
stream error propagation is not the case. In the next step of diagnosis, if the store
address register is faulty and the memory backup is valid, the error is considered as
recoverable and the program will go to the recovery block. However, in this case, the
memory write address register, xM2 , is not faulty and the diagnosis routine will proceed
to the next step. Now, it is time to check for errors in the store value register which
is positive, and the recovery block will be engaged. In the recovery block, first, the
effect of error from the memory will get eliminated by writing the memory backup data
(preserved in SCR register) into the store target address memory location. Then,
the effect of the error from the registers will be corrected by performing majority-
voting. And, finally, the error-free program execution continues from before memory
write instruction.
In the second case, error alters the data of xM1 register in a way that the erroneous
value became equal to the value loaded from an about-to-update memory location,
which is saved in SCR. In this case, the non-silent store will be treated as a silent one.
However, based on the facts that (1) the VCR value is equal to SCR (computed redun-
dantly with correct load instructions), (2) the SCR value is equal to xM1 -faulty value,
and, (3) xM1 value is different from x
D
1 because of the fault, the value of VCR register
will not be equal to the xD1 value, and the program goes to the diagnosis/recovery
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routine. Diagnosis/recovery routine will behave exactly similar to the first case, and
recovery block gets engaged by the third check (mismatch in store value register).
2) Error alters the effective address of a store instruction during its
execution. If an error occurs on functional unit flip-flops during the calculation of
effective address or errors on load-store unit queues while processing a memory write
request, a correct value will be written into a wrong memory location.
Considering the fact that in an NEMESIS-protected program, only not-silent store
instructions will actually execute, these errors are easily detectable by the load-back
strategy, because the reloaded value is different from the D-stream computed version
of store value (xD1 ). However, recovery from these types of errors seems extremely
hard, because the wrongly-written memory location is unknown. In the diagnosis
block, a copy from the store memory target location will be saved in VCR register
initially. The next four checks, inter-stream error propagation, store address register,
store value register and checking-load instruction execution checks will take place
in order, and no discrepancy will be found. Ultimately, the diagnosis routine will
perform its last check which reveals that the store has not written its data into the
memory location that it is supposed to write into. It is concluded from the fact that
the value within the store target memory location has not changed by the execution
of the non-silent store. In this case, the presence of an unrecoverable error will be
announced by the diagnosis routine.
4.2.4 Control Flow Error Detection
Soft errors can alter the control-flow of a program by producing unexpected jumps
or wrong-direction branches in a program. An unexpected jumps arises when the
program control-flow alters in a way which is not permitted in its control flow graph
(CFG). Errors which directly modify to PC register or alter the target address of a
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Figure 4.5: Control flow protection in NEMESIS. (a) shows unprotected program
control flow. (b) shows NEMESIS branch direction double checking mechanism.
taken branch instruction (if the branch is not taken the error will be masked) are
examples of unexpected jumps. Such control flow errors can be detected or even
recovered with signature-based control flow checking techniques (Oh et al., 2002b;
Vemu and Abraham, 2011; Vemu et al., 2007). A wrong-direction control flow occurs
when a branch direction changes from taken to not-taken or vice-versa, which can
be caused by errors affecting the compare instruction register operands, execution
and the opcode of compare and branch, or even program status flag registers. If
such error occurs, all three streams will steer to the wrong direction and will execute
the wrong sequence of memory write instructions. The wrong-direction control flow
errors are more frequent than wrong-target errors, and, cannot be detected with most
of the existing signature-based control flow checking techniques (Shrivastava et al.,
2014; Didehban and Shrivastava, 2016). Hence, the focus of NEMESIS transformation
is to detect and recover from wrong direction control flow errors while a signature-
based control flow checking technique can be employed for handling unexpected jumps
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control flow errors.
In order to detect wrong-direction control flow errors, NEMESIS double checks the
direction of a conditional branch by placing an intermediate block, called direction-
check block, between each source and destination BBs (Basic Blocks) in the original
program control flow. These intermediate, direction-check blocks are necessary be-
cause they make direction double checking possible even for multiple-entry destination
BBs. In each direction-check block, NEMESIS inserts a redundant (D-stream) com-
pare instruction and announces the presence of error only if the redundant compare
changes the direction of the conditional branch in a different way from the original
(M-stream) compare instruction. However, if no error is detected, the program con-
trol goes to the destination BB by a direct branch which is positioned at the end
of direction-check block. These unique features of NEMESIS control flow checking
mechanism provide complete wrong-direction error detection and also maximize the
masking effect of compare instruction.
Figure 4.5 demonstrates NEMESIS control flow transformation for a simple pro-
gram which has both, single-entry (BB3 and BB5) and multiple-entry destination (BB4)
basic blocks. In the Figure, NEMESIS direction-check blocks are marked as BB1-3,
BB1-4, BB2-4, and BB2-5. A direction-check block contains four instructions, a D-
stream copy of the source BB compare instruction, a conditional branch instruction
to the diagnosis/recovery block, and two redundant direct branches to the destination
BB. The condition of the conditional branch instruction in a direction-check block is
specified in such way that it will not change the control flow of the program in a fault-
free run, and, the control flow will reach to the destination BB. For that purpose,
if the control flow changes when the branch is not-taken (from BB1 to BB3 or from
BB2 to BB5), the condition of the conditional branch instruction in the direction-check
block is as same as the condition of branch in the source BB. On the other hand, if
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the control flow changes from source to the destination BB when a branch is taken
(from BB1 or BB2 to the BB4), the condition of the conditional branch instruction in
the direction-check block will be opposite to the condition of the branch in the source
BB. For instance, if the branch in source BB is ”b.eq (branch equal)“, the conditional
branch in the direction-check block will be ”b.ne (branch not equal)“.
In a fault-free run of a program, the conditional of the conditional branch in
direction-check block is always false, and the control flow goes to the destination BB
with the first direct branch instruction. However, if soft error alters the direction
of the source BB branch, the conditional branch in the direction-check block will
change the control flow of the program to the corresponding recovery block. Note
that, the second direct branch in the direction-check block (the last instruction) just
gets execute if an error affects the execution of first directed branch in a way that it
cannot change the control flow of the program.
4.2.5 Control Flow Error Diagnosis/Recovery
The control flow error diagnosis routine is simple because it just needs to check
for inter-stream error propagation, and, if that is the case, the error is consider as
detectable/not-recoverable. Otherwise, diagnosis routine transfers the control of the
execution to the recovery block, where, majority-voting takes place between compare
register operands, and the program resumes its error-free execution from the M-stream
compare instruction.
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4.3 Experimental Methodology
4.3.1 Compilation and Simulation Framework
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of NEMESIS fault tolerant technique, we im-
plemented NEMESIS and SWIFTR techniques as late back-end passes in LLVM 3.7
infrastructure (Lattner and Adve, 2004) for an ARMv8-a ISA. This implementation
enabled us to take advantage of the all advanced compiler optimization. We compiled
twelve benchmarks from MiBench benchmark suite (Guthaus et al., 2001) with -O3
compiler optimization flag. For each program we produced three versions, Original,
SWIFTR and NEMESIS. Please note that we did not modify the standard library
functions and therefore we exclude them from all of fault injection and performance
overhead evaluation results shown in this work. We performed extensive fault injec-
tion experiments on different hardware components of a modern, high-performance
low-power, ARM cortex-A53 like microprocessor simulated in gem5 (Binkert et al.,
2011) a cycle accurate simulator. Table 2.2 shows the details of the processor config-
uration.
4.3.2 Fault Model and Fault Injection Set-up
Fault model and fault sites: We inject single bit-flip per execution as our fault
model in this work. We injected faults on different bits of various hardware compo-
nents including general purpose integer register file, pipeline decoder and instruction
queue registers, integer functional units and load-store unit buffers. Injecting faults
only in register file does not accurately capture the effect of soft errors that happen
in the entire system (Shrivastava et al., 2014). Very importantly, injecting faults in
register file will not cause inter-stream error propagation. However, they can hap-
pen for example, when errors happen on an instruction register and alters a register
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number from one set of registers (M-/D- and R-regs) to another. Our fault injection
scheme – where we insert faults everywhere in the processor – allows for such errors.
Number of fault injections experiments and outcome classification: In an
attempt to cover all cases, we randomly inject 100,000 faults for each version of a
program per fault site. For each version of a program, we injected 400,000 (4 *
100,000) faults in four hardware components. Overall, we inject 14,400,000 (400,000
* 3 * 12) fault injection experiments. According to (Leveugle et al., 2009), these
extensive fault injection experiments provide us more the 95% confidence interval
with less than 0.1% error rate, which is 10x less error rate than previous works
(Didehban and Shrivastava, 2016; Mitropoulou et al., 2013b; Feng et al., 2010; Reis
et al., 2007).
For each fault injection experiment, a target component and a (bit, cycle) are
randomly selected statically. Once the simulator reaches the target fault injection
cycle, simulation is paused and the selected bit is flipped, then, the simulation run
resumes its execution till simulation terminates or the allowable simulation time gets
over. The result of each simulation run is classified into one of the following category:
Masked: Program terminates and the output is correct. Note that faults, which are
recovered by SWIFTR and NEMESIS techniques, also count as masked faults.
Failed: Program terminates normally, but, the output is incorrect. This is the case
of Silent Data Corruptions or SDCs.
SegFault: Program terminates by generating some symptoms such as segmentation
fault or simulation time is over. We consider segmentation faults as detected, and
focus our work on Silent Data Corruptions that go undetected, and are hardest to
catch, and therefore recover from.
Detected/Not-Recoverable: In this case, program terminates by announcing the
presence of a unrecoverable error. This type of outcome can only happen while the
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Figure 4.6: Out of 15 million fault injection experiments (evenly distributed between
original, SWIFTR and NEMESIS versions of programs), 237K result in SDCs in the
ORG program, 120K in the SWIFTR program, and 0 in the NEMESIS program.
fault is injected during the execution of an NEMESIS-protected program.
4.4 Evaluation and Analysis
4.4.1 Fault Injection Results
Figure 4.6 shows the number of fault injection runs that resulted in SDCs for
unprotected (ORG), SWIFTR and NEMESIS versions of the programs. The Figure
shows that of the 5 million runs, the original program results in SDC about 237K
times. The SWIFTR version ends up with 120K times occurrence of SDCs. As
compared to these, NEMESIS protected programs do not cause any SDCs.
Figure 4.7 depicts the number of fault injection experiments that lead to SDCs per
hardware component. We show the actual number of failures because, commonly used
metrics such as fault coverage or even the percentage of masked faults may lead to
fault detection/correction overestimation in techniques like NEMESIS or SWIFTR
which expand the bit-cycle fault space of the original program (Schirmeier et al.,
2015). Note that the Y-axis of the graph, or Number of SDCs is in exponential scale
and that the last bar in each graph shows the total number of experiments that
72
169070
108,674
1
10
100
1000
10000
100000
1000000
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
SD
C
s
Original SWIFTR Nemesis
0
25,131
6,676
1
10
100
1000
10000
100000
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
SD
C
s
Original SWIFTR Nemesis
0
25,360 3,452
1
10
100
1000
10000
100000
Original SWIFTR Nemesis
0
17,498 1,862
1
10
100
1000
10000
100000
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
SD
C
s
Original SWIFTR Nemesis
0
Load-Store Unit Register file
Pipeline Registers Functional Units
Figure 4.7: Fault injections in different hardware component of simulated micro-
processor never lead to failure, while running NEMESIS-protected programs.
resulted in SDC. We can see from all the four plots that fault injection in NEMESIS-
protected programs never resulted in SDCs. This implies that NEMESIS error detec-
tion is able to detect all injected faults. The NEMESIS diagnosis routine always cor-
rectly distinguished recoverable errors from unrecoverable ones, and the recovery rou-
tine always eliminated the effect of error completely. NEMESIS error detection is able
to detect all errors because it checks for the results of critical instructions rather than
their operands, and it covers infrequent cases like silent-stores and missing-memory
updates. In comparison with original versions of programs, SWIFTR-protected pro-
grams, on average, produced 35%, 73%. 86% and 89% less failures for faults injected
in load-store unit, register file, pipeline registers and functional units, respectively.
Surprisingly, in some cases such as fault injection in the load-store unit for programs
like basicmath and rijndeal, SWIFTR transformation actually increases the number
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of failures! The reason is that in comparison with original codes, SWIFTR transfor-
mation dramatically increases the number of memory operations for register-hungry
programs and leaves them unprotected. NEMESIS transformation also increases the
number of memory operations, but NEMESIS protects them either by triplication
(read operations) or loadback techniques (write operations). Voting time-to-check
to time-to-use is the cause of failures due to faults in the register file for SWIFTR-
protected programs. Faults that happen on pipeline registers or functional units,
while they are processing the execution of critical instructions, e.g., memory, com-
pare and branch instructions, may lead to a failure in SWIFTR-protected program.
For instance, faults which convert the opcode of a compare instruction to some other
instruction may change the control flow of a program, but will remain undetectable
in programs protected by SWIFTR.
4.4.2 Analysis of Injected Faults
Figure 4.8 shows the fault injection experimental result distribution for original
and NEMESIS-protected versions of the programs. It can be seen that very significant
percentage of faults are masked, even in original programs (on average about 77%),
and adding protection increases the number of masked faults, on average, by about
13%. NEMESIS-transformation also slightly decreases the number of SegFault, on
average, from 11.5% to 9.5%. We believe most of these segmentation faults can
be recovered by NEMESIS, if programs execute NEMESIS diagnosis and recovery
routines in the their signal handling functions. However, since that in our simulation
environment the simulator does not forward the segmentation faults signal (SIGSEGV
signal) to the program and directely terminates the simulation, we have segmentation
faults in our results. The graph also shows that just a negligible amount of faults
(about 0.42%, on average) lead to unrecoverable errors.
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Figure 4.8: NEMESIS protected code increases the percentage of masked faults by
13%, and completely eliminates SDCs.
4.4.3 Analysis of Diagnosis Routine Outcomes
Figure 4.9 shows the outcome distribution of diagnosis routine. The diagnosis
routine determines the scope of error propagation and decides if the detected error
is recoverable. The graph shows that more than 97% of the detected errors are
recoverable. 3% of the cases, where NEMESIS cannot recover are when the faults
cause an inter-steam error propagation, or when the fault causes an error in the
effective address of the store instruction during the execution of the store instruction.
In these cases, NEMESIS cannot find out the correct register value (because all are
different) or wrongly-written-into memory location, and therefore can detect but not
recover.
75
90%
92%
94%
96%
98%
100%
%
 o
f 
d
e
te
ct
e
d
 f
au
lt
s
Recoverable Detected/Not-Recoverable
Figure 4.9: Nemesis transformation is able to successfully recover from more than
97% of detected faults, while 3% of detected fault remains unrecoverable
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Figure 4.10: Nemesis-protected programs, on an average run 30% faster than
SWIFTR protected ones.
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4.4.4 Execution Time Overhead
Figure 4.10 shows the execution time overhead for SWIFTR and NEMESIS ver-
sions of the programs. Compared to the original code, SWIFTR and NEMESIS
transformations, on average, increase the execution time of the program by about
5X and 3.4X, respectively. The NEMESIS-protected programs run, on average, 30%
faster than SWIFTR-protected ones, because they execute less number of instructions.
For instance, for each memory read operation, NEMESIS transformation just adds
two extra redundant instructions while SWIFTR transformation requires a majority-
voting, which needs 4 machine instructions in our implementation, and two extra
move instructions. The number of extra instructions added for memory write op-
eration protection, for both NEMESIS and SWIFTR transformations is 8 machine
instruction. However, since NEMESIS does not execute silent stores, it executes on
average 18% less memory write operations. For each compare instruction, SWIFTR
transformation requires two voting operations (so a total of 8 instructions), however,
NEMESIS transformation adds just 3 extra instructions. Note that the SWIFTR and
NEMESIS register reservation for redundant instructions, impose considerably high
overhead in some register-hungry applications like rijndeal.
The performance overhead reported in this work may seem higher than simi-
lar/previous works because for two main reasons: First, we exclude the number of
cycles that a program spends in standard library calls from our execution time estima-
tion, because we didn’t modify such functions, and second similar works usually select
a much wider and aggressively out-of-order processor, that can hide the performance
overhead due to the execution of the extra instructions. Nevertheless, considering
the fault coverage provided by NEMESIS, its performance overhead is reasonable
and even competitive with many coarse-grain software and hardware error detec-
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tion/recovery technique. This is because such techniques usually demand two extra
cores for running redundant codes and some extra operations for majority-voting,
which overall can be considered as more than 3x overhead.
4.5 Conclusions
We present NEMESIS as a complete solution for protecting computing against
soft errors. NEMESIS is a software level redundancy-based technique which checks
the results of memory write operations and the direction of branch instructions. If
any violation is detected, NEMESIS diagnosis and recovery schemes undo the effect of
error from processor and memory state, and the program can continue its execution.
NEMESIS strategy provides near-immediate error recovery which is crucial for work-
loads like real-time and interactive applications. However, those applications which
do not require such rapid error recovery can still benefit from NEMESIS error detec-
tion technique as it can detect all faults that cause SDCs – a claim that most previous
techniques cannot make. We evaluated the effectiveness of NEMESIS against state-
of-the-art error recovery techniques by performing about 15 million processor-wide
single bit-flip fault injection experiments on original and protected versions of differ-
ent programs. Our experimental results show that NEMESIS protected programs do
not incur any SDC. On an average, NEMESIS protected programs run 30% faster
than SWIFTR protected programs.
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Chapter 5
LOW LEVEL CRASH TESTING AND ADJUSTMENTS
The goal of this chapter is to quantify the error coverage capability of the proposed
software-level solutions through RTL-level fault injection experiments. To propose a
general (ISA-independent) solution, we first propose gZDC, a combination of nZDC
data-flow error detection and NEMESIS control-flow error protection. gZDC also uti-
lizes coarse-grained scheduling and asymmetric control-flow signatures to reduce the
chance of hard-to-detect control-flow errors. Statistical single bit-flip fault injection
experiments on different hardware components of a synthesizable Verilog description
of an OpenRISC-based microprocessor reveals that gZDC transformations can achieve
more than 99.9% error coverage.
5.1 gZDC Overview
An error may lead to failure by changing application data-flow or its control-flow.
To detect data-flow errors, gZDC utilizes nZDC load-backing strategy introduced in
Section 2.4. Control-flow errors can furthermore be divided into (1) Wrong direction
control flow errors i.e. errors alter the direction of a branch, and (2) Unexpected
jumps i.e. errors which cause a random jump to an arbitrary location. In following
subsections, we describe gZDC solution for each type of these control-flow errors.
5.1.1 Wrong Direction Control Flow Errors
To detect wrong-direction control-flow errors, gZDC adopts NEMESIS control-
flow detection scheme (Didehban et al. (2017b)) and performs redundant check on
the direction of each conditional branch. It raises error detection flag only if an error
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has altered the direction of the branch. Note that simple branch duplication is inef-
fective because usually the result of a branch is a change in program control flow (i.e.
update on PC), not a value that can be simply duplicated and check later. Therefore,
since simple branch duplication is useless and we use branch checking instruction
to verify the direction of branches. Branch checking instructions use the redundant
registers and their destinations are always error detection routine. Contingent upon
the direction of the original branch instruction, the opcode of branch checking in-
structions (branch condition) can be either same or opposite to the original branch
condition. Basically, there are two possible paths after each conditional branch in-
structions: (1) Taken path – when branch condition is true and control of execution
should be changed, and (2) Fall through path – when branch condition is false and
there will be no change in program control flow. Based on the possible outcomes of a
conditional branch (taken or untaken) the opcode and the position of branch checking
instructions are determined as follow:
Direction checking for taken branches: Placing checking branch instructions
after taken conditional branches is useless simply because branch checking instruc-
tions would not even get a chance to be executed. A naive solution can be placing
branch checking instructions right in the beginning of the branch target basic block.
Unfortunately, such solution will lead to a false alarm in the cases that the branch
target basic block is a merge basic block – it has more than one predecessors. For
instance, consider program shown in Figure 5.1(a). In the code, control can reach to
.BB3 (target address of the conditional branch BNE R1, R2, .BB3) from either .BB0
or .BB1. When control reaches to the .BB3 from .BB0 the value of R1 register is
definitely “not equal(NE)” to the value of R2. However, that condition may or may
not be true if the control lands to .BB3 from .BB1 block.
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To solve this problem, gZDC transformation first creates an intermediate blocks
(.BB-CH in Figure 5.1(b)), then verifies the direction of branch by executing branch
checking instruction (marked as 2○ in the Figure), and finally transfers the control
flow to the desirable block by inserting a direct jump instructions (marked as 3○ in
the Figure). The condition of branch checking instruction in the taken branch cases in
oppose to the original conditional branch instructions. For example, in this case the
opcode of branch checking instruction in intermediate block .BB-CH is “BEQ (Branch
Equal)” which is opposite to the “BNE (Branch Not Equal)” operation. The reason
is that if the original branch is taken, the condition is true (R1 is not equal to R2
in our example) and the opposite condition should be false. Therefore, the branch
checking instruction is always untaken and control will transfer to the destination
block by the next direct jump. However, if an error influences the direction of branch
and alters its direction from untaken to taken, the control flow will reach to the
intermediate block wrongly. In those cases, the program control flow will be directed
to the error handling block by checking branch instruction because their condition is
always opposite to the original error-free branch – the checking branch instruction is
taken because the original error-free branch was untaken.
Furthermore, to make sure that actual jump takes place (control redirects to the
destination BB), we insert a direct jump to error detection block, after each direct
jump instruction in the code (marked as 4○ in the Figure). This is required for the
cases which because of soft error (i.e., errors affecting the opcode of jump) a jump
instruction alters to another instruction (e.g., arithmetic or even memory operation).
Direction checking for untaken branches: For cases that original branch in
untaken and control flow goes to the basic block right after the branch, gZDC inserts
a branch checking instruction with the exact same opcode (condition) but shadow
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BNE   R1, R2, .BB3
.BB0
BNE   R1, R2, .BB-CH
.BB0
.BB2 .BB3
BNE R1*, R2*, .Err
BEQ R1*, R2*, .Err
Jump    .BB3
Jump    .Err
.BB2
.BB3
.BB-CH
Jump  .BB3
Jump  .BB3
Jump  .Err
.BB1
.BB1
(a) Original Control-Flow (b) gZDC wrong-direction control-flow error detection
1
3
2
4
4
Figure 5.1: gZDC inserts a branch direction check basic block between all control
flow edges from a taken conditional branch to a merge basic block. The inserted BB
always composed of a branch direction-check instruction followed by two direct jump
instructions.
register operands from the original branch immediately after the original branch. 1
Instruction marked as 1○ in the Figure is an example of branch checking instruction
for untaken branches. The key point here is that if the original branch in untaken,
the checking branch instruction is untaken as well and the program execution will
continue as expected. However, if an error alters the direction of the original branch
from taken to untaken, the checking branch instruction will direct the control flow
operation to the error handling block. Since all architectures provide conditional
branch operation, this solution is applicable on all targets. Note that all conditional
branches in 5.1 can be changed to separate compare and branch instructions (e.g. for
ARM ISA) without any affect on the protection.
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Figure 5.2: The impact of fine-grained vs coarse-gained instruction scheduling on
intra-BB undetected unwanted jumps. Main and Redundant instructions are shown
by M and R letters respectively and arrows represent undetected intra-BB forward
unwanted jumps. Part (a) shows fine-grained instruction scheduling which leaves
many unwanted jumps (dashed arrows) as undetected because such jumps cause no
mismatch between the state of redundant registers. Part (b) shows coarse-grained
scheduling policy which has a lesser chance of undetected unwanted jumps errors.
5.1.2 Unexpected Jumps
We define unexpected (or unwanted) jump error as causes that an error changes
program control flow in a way that is not allowed by program static control flow
graph. Examples are errors on PC, errors on target field of direct/indirect branch
instructions, errors altering the opcode of a non-branch instruction to a branch/jump
and errors on address field of branch target address buffer structure. We divide un-
wanted jump errors into intra-BB (unwanted jumps from one basic block to itself) and
inter-BB (unwanted jumps from one basic blocks to another) jumps. gZDC adopts
different solutions to address each of these cases:
1Technically, in this case a new basic block will be inserted between original basic block and the
fall-through basic block.
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Intra-BB unwanted jump detection: To detect the manifestation of intra-BB un-
wanted jumps, we introduce a different static instruction scheduling than the one that
usually is used in the state-of-the-art error detection scheme. Figure 5.2(a) illustrates
widely-used scheduling policy for interleaving main and redundant instructions. Such
instruction scheduling (i.e. interleaving main and redundant operations one by one)
is extremely vulnerable to unexpected short jumps.
Basically, any unexpected jump from an equal-point-of-execution which skips (in
forward or backward direction) exactly same number of main and redundant instruc-
tions will remain undetected. We define equal-point-of-execution as program exe-
cution points2 which at that point the value of all main and redundant registers
pairs are equal. For instance, all program execution points before the execution of
main instructions (represented by M in Figure 5.2(a)) are equal-point-of-execution. 3
Dashed arrows in Figure represent forward unwanted jumps that basically cannot be
detected by instruction-duplication based schemes because they cause no mismatch
in the state of registers.
Note that in the Figure we just show forward undetected jumps, undetected back-
ward jumps can be easily pictured by reversing the direction of arrows. Figure 5.2(b)
shows an alternative scheduling policy (called coarse-grained scheduling of main and
redundant instructions) which significantly reduces the chance of undetected jump
errors. The main idea behind coarse-grained scheduling is that if an unexpected
jump leads to a discrepancy between the state of main and redundant registers, most
probably will be detected later on by further error checking operations.
Furthermore, the presence of gZDC data-flow and control-flow error checking op-
2Program execution points are points between two consecutive instructions in a program.
3Note that if redundant instructions are inserted into the code before instruction scheduler phase
in compilation pipeline, the scheduling of main and redundant instructions may be slightly different.
Nevertheless, our definition of equal-point-of-execution is independent on scheduling policy.
84
Store R1  [R2]
load  R1 [R2*]
BNE  R1, R1*, Err
(a)
Store R1  [R2]
load  R1 [R2*]
BNE  R1, R1*, Err
(b)
M
ai
n
 
C
o
m
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
s
R
ed
u
n
d
an
t 
C
o
m
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
s
M
ai
n
 
C
o
m
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
s
R
ed
u
n
d
an
t 
C
o
m
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
s
Figure 5.3: Coarse-grained scheduling in the presence of store and checking op-
erations. As part (a) shows scheduling store and corresponding checking opera-
tions at the end of basic block introduces new possibilities for undetected unwanted
jumps. Dashed arrows represent these undetected jumps. Part (b) shows gZDC
coarse-grained main-redundant instruction scheduling policy in presence of store and
checking instructions.
erations restricts the window of coarse-grained scheduling policy. For instance, Figure
5.3(a) shows a naive implementation of proposed scheduling strategy for a basic block
with a store instruction. As it shows compared to Figure 5.2(b), the number of pos-
sible undetected unwanted jumps actually increase from ’1’ to ’5’. Now, jumps from
the beginning of the basic block to the right before store or right before error checking
instruction (BNE R1, R1*, Err) is also undetectable. In addition, jumps from right
before store to the end of basic block or right before error checking instruction are
also remain undetected. gZDC solution to mitigate this problem is to consider store
instruction as a main and checking load operation as well as error checking instruc-
tion (BNE R1, R1*, Err) as redundant instructions. Figure 5.3(b) shows the gZDC
instruction scheduling policy. As the Figure shows, such scheduling can reduce the
number of undetected jumps from ’5’ to ’2’.
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We did not count a short jump skipping over the last two instructions in Figure
5.3(b), because such unwanted jumps are benign and do not change the functionality
of the program. Note that if there is a dependency between store and prior load
operations inside a basic block (they access same memory location), the redundant
load should be inserted before the conflicting store. Similar to store case, placing
wrong direction control-flow checking operations at the end of basic blocks (Figure
5.4(a)) also introduces new vulnerable cases for unwanted-jump errors.
Figure 5.4b demonstrates gZDC wrong direction control-flow errors with coarse-
grained scheduling policy. As shown, gZDC transformation first schedules main
stream of instructions followed by the conditional branch instruction. Then it inserts
corresponding redundant stream of instructions and direction checking operations in
both taken and fall through paths.
Inter-BB unwanted jump detection: One of the main advantages of coarse-
grained main/redundant instruction scheduling is that not only such scheduling re-
duce the chance of intra-BB unwanted jumps, but also is effective in inter-BB un-
wanted jump error detection. The reason lies in the drastic reduction in the number of
equal-point-of-execution (i.e. the program points that live main and redundant regis-
ters have the same values). Generally, all unwanted (intra and inter basic block) jumps
from program point S to E remain undetected if both S and E are equal-point-of-
executions in instruction-replication schemes. That is because such unwanted jumps
cause no discrepancy in the state of main and redundant registers and therefore there
is no chance to be detected by error checking instructions. Coarse-grained scheduling
policy reduces the chance of undetected unwanted errors by simply reducing the num-
ber of equal-point-of-execution in a protected by an instruction-duplication scheme.
To further reduce the possibility of undetected jumps, similar to existing signature-
based control-flow checking schemes (Goloubeva et al., 2003; Abadi et al., 2005) gZDC
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Figure 5.4: Coarse-grained scheduling in the presence of conditional branch opera-
tions. (a) Naive scheduling by inserting conditional branch at the end of basic block.
(b) gZDC wrong direction control flow and coarse-gained instruction scheduling.
encodes static control-flow footprints (signatures) into the program and dynamically
checks their results at the critical point of execution i.e. before and after system calls.
Particularly, gZDC transformation designates two specific general purpose registers,
called MICR (Main Instruction Check Register) and RICR (Redundant Instruction
Check Register) to control-flow signature updating and checking. These two registers
get updated during the execution of program and their values are checked against each
other for error detection purposes only before and after system calls. Defining these
two redundant registers forces another condition to program equal-point-of-executions.
Now, for a point of execution to satisfy the condition of equal-point-of-executions apart
of equal value for all live main and redundant registers, MICR and RICR registers
should also have same exact values. The key point in gZDC unwanted-jump detection
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strategy is asymmetrical updates for MICR and RICR registers which tries to keep
the values of MICR and RICR registers different as far as it is possible and therefore
removes the equal-point-of-executions.
Listing 1 shows gZDC asymmetric control flow registers updating algorithm. 4
Algorithm 1 consists of three phases: 1) updating MICR, 2) updating RICR regis-
ter, and 3) eliminating symmetric updates. First, the compiler assigns each main-
instruction-included-BB (BB with at least one main instruction) a unique number,
called basic block signature. Note that main instructions are arithmetic, logical or
memory operations that use only main registers as their operands. Then it inserts
instructions to update the value of MICR register by xoring the value of MICR regis-
ter with basic block signature right after the last main instruction in the basic blocks
(line 4-6). By the end of this step, each main-instruction-included BB should include
one MICR-updating instruction. In the second phase (line 9-16), RICR-updating
operations will be inserted only into BBs which are predecessors of all control-flow
merge or join BBs. 5 This lazy updates on RICR register lead to asymmetric (up-
dates with different immediate value) on MICR and RICR registers which minimizes
the number of equal-point-of-executions. To insert a RICR-updating instruction into
a basic block, we should first calculate the correct immediate value of xor operation
which is an aggregated xor between all basic block signatures in a backward path
from current BB to the first join BB (line 11).
Figure 5.5 shows gZDC asymmetric control-flow signature updating algorithm for
a simple case. As Figure 5.5(a) illustrates both BB0 and BB1 are join BBs. Applying
gZDC wrong direction control flow error detection transformation (Figure 5.5(b)) in-
4The redundant signature registers only carry the same value before system calls or end of the
function and error detection operations also will be inserted both before/after system calls and the
end of functions.
5Basic blocks with more than one predecessors are join basic blocks.
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Algorithm 1 gZDC asymmetric CF signature updating
Input: gZDC coarse-grained scheduled program
Output: gZDC coarse-grained scheduled program with unwanted jump error detec-
tion
1: Initialization : MICR = RICR = 0;
2: Assign unique number Sigi to each main-instruction-included BBi in Input
3: /*First Phase: Updating MICR*/
4: /*Top-down control flow traversal*/
5: for each BBi in Input do
6: if (BBi is a main-instruction-included BB) then
7: lmInst = last main instruction in BBi
8: Create Instruction Inst: MICR = MICR ⊕ Sigi
9: Insert Inst after lmInst
10: end if
11: end for
12: /*Second Phase: Updating RICR*/
13: /*Top-down control flow traversal*/
14: for each BBi in Input do
15: if (BBi is a predecessor of a join BB) then
16: aggrSig = aggregated xor of BBi signature with its all consecutive prede-
cessors to the first join BB
17: frInst = first redundant instruction in BBi
18: Create Instruction Inst: RICR = RICR ⊕ aggrSig
19: insert operation Inst before frInst
20: end if
21: end for
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22: /*Third Phase: eliminating symmetric updates*/
23: /* bottom-up control flow traversal*/
24: for each BBi in Input do
25: if (BBi includes MICR and RICR instructions) then
26: immMICR = immediate value of MICR updating instruction in BBi
27: immRICR = immediate value of RICR updating instruction in BBi
28: if immMICR == immRICR then
29: randomNum = a random number
30: immRICR = immRICR ⊕ randomNum
31: for each preBBi of BBi do
32: if preBBi includes a RICR updating instruction then
33: immRICR = immediate value of RICR updating instruction in
preBBi
34: immRICR = immRICR ⊕ randomNum
35: else
36: frInst = first redundant instruction in preBBi
37: Create Instruction Inst: RICR = RICR ⊕ randomNum
38: insert Inst before frInst
39: end if
40: end for
41: end if
42: end if
43: end for
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creases the number of program BBs by three (BB0_1, BB0_2 and BB0_CH are added
by gZDC transformation). This transformed control flow graph includes two main-
instruction-included-BB (BB0 and BB0_1) and two BBs with join successor ((BB0_2
and BB0_CH)). According to phase one of the Algorithm 1, MICR-updating instruc-
tions are inserted into BB0 and BB0_1 right after the last main instruction. These
instructions are shown as MICR ⊕ sig_BB0 and MICR ⊕ sig_BB0_1 in the Figure.
Based on the second phase of the algorithm, RICR-updating operations are inserted
into BB0_2 and BB0_CH. To compute the offset of xor operation for BB0_2, we should
traverse control flow graph backward to the last join BB (Dashed arrows in the Figure
shows this path). Such path consists of BB0_2, BB0_1 and BB0. However, since BB0_2
is not a main-instruction-including-BB it does not have a signature and the aggregated
signature is calculated by xoring the signature of BB0_1 (Sig_BB0_1) and signature
of BB0 (Sig_BB0). The last instruction in BB0_2 shows inserted RICR-updating in-
struction. Similar to the BB0_2, a RICR-updating instruction is also inserted in the
BB0_CH.
The last phase of Algorithm 1 (line 17 to 36) deals with the problem of symmet-
ric updates on both MICR and RICR registers. The problem in symmetric updates
is that they introduce equal-point-of-executions which alleviates the chance of unde-
tected jumps. For instance, unwanted jumps from the beginning to the end of a BB
which consists of main instructions follow by symmetric updates on MICR and RICR
registers and redundant instructions remain undetected because such jumps do not
cause any mismatch in the state of pair main/redundant registers. To detect sym-
metric update cases, gZDC transformation goes over all program basic blocks starting
from the end of program (exit basic blocks) and first checks if a basic block contains
both MICR-updating and RICR-updating instructions (line 18). If yes, it extracts
the immediate field of signature updating instructions and checks if those values are
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Figure 5.5: Complete gZDC data-flow and control-flow transformations for a simple
loop. (a) shows control-flow for a simple loop, and (b) shows corresponding gZDC
code with static signature updating operations. MICR-updating instructions are
inserted into the main-instruction-included-BB and RICR-updating instruction are
inserted into successor BBs of a join BBs. The dashed arrow shows backward trace
path to compute the aggregated signature required for RICR-updating instruction in
BB0 2.
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same (line 18-21). If a BB with symmetric updates is detected, then the algorithm
generates random number and updates the immediate field of RICR-updating instruc-
tion (line 2-23). This makes signature updating instructions asymmetric. However,
to maintain the consistency, signature modification for predecessor BBs of current
BB is also required (lines 24 to 33). Basically, same exact random number should
be xored with the RICR-updating instruction in the predecessor blocks as well. If
the predecessor block does not have such instruction, the algorithm creates one and
inserts it into the basic block before its first redundant instruction (line 29 and 31).
5.2 Experimental Methodology
In this section, we describe our experimental environment and evaluation strategy
to measure the re-evaluate the error coverage and performance overhead of SWIFT
and gZDC transformations. Note that we did not implement nZDC (explained in
Chapeter 2) because as we mentioned before nZDC is ISA-dependent (nZDC control-
flow is compatible with ARM V8-a ISA) and cannot be implemented on OpenRISC
ISA.
5.2.1 Microprocessor and Fault injection Environment
We used single-issue 5-stage pipeline Mor1kx cappuccino microprocessor (the lat-
est version of OpenRISC1000 processor family) which is capable of running Linux
operating system (Mor, 2013). The microprocessor configuration is shown in table
5.1. We simulated the synthesizable HDL Verilog codes of Mor1kx microprocessor by
Icarus Verilog simulator (Williams, 2006).
Figure 5.6 depicts high-level block diagram of mor1kx microprocessor. The micro-
processor core components includes instruction and memory caches, a simple branch
predictor, register file, processor data path and load-store unit. Note that for sim-
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Table 5.1: Mor1kx microprocessor configuration
Parameter Value
ISA OpenRISC
CPU model In-order Single-issue Mor1kx
Pipeline 5 stage (cappuccino)
# of General Purpose Registers 32
Branch prediction Backward taken, forward not taken
L1 D/I cache 8KB(2 way)/8KB(2 way)
Cache line size 32 bytes
RAM size 32 MB
Instr. 
Cache
Data Cache
LSU
Branch predictor
Decode 
execute
Execute CTRL
Register 
File
W
B
Protected by ECC
Unprotected
P
C
M
u
x
Not Vulnerable
Dec
oder
Func. 
Unit
Fetch/Decode Unit
Fetch
Figure 5.6: Mor1kx architecture. Caches and Branch predictor are excluded from
fault injection analysis.
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Table 5.2: Fault Injection Features
Component Fault Model # of fault sites
Register File Single Event Upseta 1024
Fetch/Decode Unit Single Event Upset 200
Decode/Execute Unit Single Event Upset 216
Execute/Control Unit Single Event Upset 183
Write/Back Unit Single Event Upset 32
ALU Single-event transientb 36
LSU Single-event transient 101
a Errors are injected on flip-flops.
b Errors are injected on combinational circuits.
plicity, pipeline forwarding paths from ALU to Decode/Execute and from WriteBack
to Decode/Execute stage are not shown in the Figure. Inline with previous work
(Reis et al., 2005, 2007; Feng et al., 2010; Laguna et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2016), we
assume that instruction/Data caches are ECC-protected and we exclude them from
our fault injection sites (these components are highlighted as protected by ECC in
the Figure). We also exclude branch predictor because as pinpointed by mukher-
jee2003systematic, transient errors on such performance-enhancing structures does
not cause lead to a failure. We conducted fault injection experiments on the rest of
microprocessor hardware components including Fetch/Decode, Decode/Execute, Exe-
cute Control, Register File, ALU, LSU, WriteBack. Table 5.2 summarizes the number
of fault sites and the injected fault model in fault injection target components.
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5.2.2 Compilation and Binary Generation
We utilize clang and LLVM-or1k (LLV, 2017) compiler infrastructures and com-
pile 8 programs from Mibench (Guthaus et al., 2001) test suite and 10x10 matrix
multiplication for mor1kx microprocessor with -O3 optimization level. Note that we
compile the whole application as appeared in Mibench test suite and did not reduce
programs to micro-benchmarks. We choose to implement error detection transfor-
mations as late back-end passes in LLVM-or1k to take advantage of all standard
compiler optimizations like dead code elimination and common-subexpression elimi-
nation. Note that since SWIFT control-flow transformation is highly dependent on
IA-64 X86 predicated instructions, we adopted an alternative implementation ex-
plained in (Reis et al., 2007) which is written by same authors as SWIFT original
paper. We only apply protection schemes to user-level functions and exclude standard
library functions from all evaluations including performance overhead and error cov-
erage estimation. However, to expand the domain of evaluation for the benchmarks
which spend most of their execution time in the library calls (e.g., qsort program
heavily uses library provided qsort function), we manually copy the source code of
the dominant library function call to the program source code from open source GNU
C (glibc) library and apply protection on them. To demonstrate the effectiveness of
the proposed technique, we generate four executable versions for each benchmark:
Original (ORG) version is the unprotected version of program without applying
any software-level protection scheme.
SWIFT version is protected by SWIFT data and control flow protection transfor-
mations. Note that we include SWIFT signature-based control-flow error detection
in this version.
gZDC-WithoutJumpDet version is protected by nZDC data-flow transformation
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(Chapter 2) and generic wrong direction control-flow error detection (explained in
Subsection 5.1.1).
gZDC version is the proposed gZDC including coarse-grained main-redundant in-
struction scheduling policy and asymmetric execution control-flow footprints (Al-
gorithm 1) for detecting the manifestation of unexpected jumps. We develop and
evaluate gZDC and gZDC-WithoutJumpDet separately to show the effectiveness of
the coarse-gain scheduling and asymmetric control-flow signature techniques on error
detection and their implications on performance overhead.
5.2.3 Fault Injection Process and Output Classification
Since the fault models used in this work are random single event transient or upset
faults, for each fault injection experiment fault injection site, b, and fault injection
time, t are randomly selected respectively among all 1792 fault injection sites and
from all cycles that a program executes user-level functions. After selecting tuple
(b,t), we start simulation normally and once the execution hits cycle t, we invert
the logical value of b (by XORing it with ’1’) for one cycle and let the execution
continues till execution terminates permanently or the execution time exceeds from
allowable simulation time which is 2 times more than fault free run of program. We
classify the results of each fault injection trial into one of the following categories:
Masked: Fault injection simulation terminates normally and generate exactly same
output as fault free run.
SW Detected: Cases that protection scheme detects the manifestation of error and
raise error detection flag.
OS/HW Detected: Fault injection simulation runs that terminate permanently by
generating an exception (i.e. segmentation faults or unkown instruction exception)
or cause a time-out error.
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Silent Data Corruption (SDCs): Cases that execution terminates normally, but
the results is different from the fault-free execution.
For each version of a program we conducted 10,600 random fault injection ex-
periments on hardware components listed in Table 5.2, which statistically provides
around 2.5% error margin for 99% confidence level (Leveugle et al., 2009). The
hardware (space) distribution of errors is corresponding to the area of hardware com-
ponents. For instance, since register file includes around 57% of targeted fault sites
(1024 of 1792), around 57% (around 6,000) of all injected errors also were injected in
register file. Since we have 9 benchmarks, we injected 95400 (10,600 * 9) faults for
each version of programs. Overall, for all versions of programs we injected 381,600 (4
* 95400) fault injection experiments.
Since all error detection schemes including SWIFT and gZDC transformations
presume some type of backward recovery (i.e. restarting or checkpoint/rollback) as
post error detection handling strategy, errors in Exceptions and Hangs category can
be considered as harmless. The main difference between Exceptions and Hangs and
Detected errors is that the former is identified by operating system or hardware
protection schemes and later is recognized by software-level error protection schemes.
Nevertheless, in both cases, the recovery routine should be invoked to remove the
manifestation of error from the system. Therefore, we consider SDC-induced faults
as failed cases because such errors remain unnoticed.
5.2.4 Number of scaled SDCs as Comparison Metric
To fairly quantify and compare the error detection capability of SWIFT, gZDC-
WithoutJumpDet and gZDC techniques, we use number of scaled SDCs (or scaled-
SDC for short) which is calculated based on an overhead-dependent correction factor
which originally proposed by (Schirmeier et al., 2015) and has been used in many
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Figure 5.7: Compared to original code, gZDC transformation reduces the number
of scaled SDCs by more than 100x.
recent techniques (So et al., 2018; Didehban and Shrivastava, 2018). Scaled-SDC cap-
tures the negative impact of runtime overhead (α) of protection schemes on execution
reliability and is estimated as below:
scaled− SDC = #ofSDCs× α (5.1)
Note that since there is no runtime overhead for original version of programs the
number of scaled SDCs is in fact equal to number of SDCs for original versions of
programs. As pinpointed by (Schirmeier et al., 2015) considering number of SDCs
(or percentage of SDCs) significantly overestimates the error coverage capability of
the protection schemes and will lead to wrong conclusion.
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5.2.5 Error Coverage Results and Analysis
Processor-wide error coverage: Figure 5.7 shows number of scaled SDCs (calcu-
lated based on equation 5.1) for different benchmarks extracted from our microprocessor-
wide fault injection experiments. In the Figure, X-axis represents different bench-
marks and Y-axis represents number of scaled-SDCs in logarithmic scale. The right-
most set of bars (denoted as total) represents the aggregated number of scaled-SDCs
for each version of programs across all benchmarks. This aggregated sum can be seen
as a large application which consists of all the benchmarks. As shown in the Figure
from 95,400 fault injection experiments performed on different microprocessor hard-
ware components during the execution of original versions of programs around 7.65%
of them result to SDCs. SWIFT transformation can reduce the number of scaled-SDC
to 1.98%. gZDC-WithoutJumpDet scheme reduces the number of scaled-SDC down
to 0.39%. Finally, gZDC improves the scaled-SDC rate of gZDC-WithoutJumpDet by
around 5x (0.07% scaled-SDCs rate). To understand the reasons behind this trend,
we analysis the vulnerability of each hardware component before and after applying
error detection transformations.
Component-wise error coverage: Figure 5.8 shows the aggregated number of
scaled-SDCs per component for different versions of programs across all benchmarks.
We start by looking at register file since around 60% (4411 of 7301) of all SDCs in
original programs (Figure 5.8(a)) caused by fault injection experiments conducted on
register file. We can see that SWIFT transformation is very effective in protecting
register file and it reduces the scaled-SDCs to only 174 cases – more than 25x relia-
bility improvement for register file. Further examination (recreating the SDC cases
and tracing the trajectory of inserted faults to the final output) shows that almost in
all of SDCs cases of SWIFT-protected programs injected fault alters the value of a
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Figure 5.8: Component-wise scaled SDC analysis. While instruction duplication
error checking schemes can effectively improve the register file vulnerability but errors
affecting fetch/decode stage of pipeline remain the main source of SDCs after applying
such schemes.
register operand of a memory or control flow instructions immediately before actual
use (read) of register by the critical instruction. Note that in these cases the fault
injection targeted register operand is either dead6 or impact of error gets masked
before the next error detection point.
As Figure 5.8(b) shows register file is no more the biggest vulnerable hardware
components after protecting programs by SWIFT transformation. Both nZDC-based
transformations (Figure 5.8(c) and 5.8(d)) considerably reduce the register file scaled-
SDCs rate. That is because they detect errors by checking registers after the execution
of critical instruction rather than prior to their execution. However, there is still some
SDCs cases for nZDC-based transformations and our tracking reveals that in all SDCs
scenarios error hit the address register of a silent stores. As we explained in Section
4.2.1, errors affecting the address part of silent stores are one of the single-point-of-
failures in nZDC-based protection schemes.
As Figure 5.8 reveals bits in fetch/decode stage of the pipeline are the most chal-
lenging parts of hardware to protect against errors by software-level redundancy
schemes as faults injected on them cause the majority of failed cases in all pro-
6A register operand is dead if the next access to that register is a write operation.
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tected versions of programs. While the number of scaled-SDC due to error injection
on fetch/decode stage flip-flops for the original version of programs is around 861,
SWIFT transformation can just slightly improve it to 720 cases (around 16%). The
main reason for such ineffective protection is because that SWIFT transformation
cannot protect program execution against errors which alter unduplicated instruc-
tions i.e. load, store and compare operations. gZDC-WithoutJumpDet can reduce
the number of scaled-SDC to 304 (64% improvement), however, it is still vulnerable
to unwanted jump control flow errors. Examples are errors affecting immediate ad-
dress of branch/jump instructions or the ones converting a none branch instruction
to branch. gZDC, on the other hand, improves the reliability of execution against
fetch/decode errors by more than 15x (from 861 to 55). This improvement shows the
effectiveness of the coarse-grain scheduling and asymmetric execution control flow
footprints strategies.
Bits in Decode/Execute stage of pipeline show similar behavior to fetch/decode
stage in terms of effectiveness of protection scheme. We can see, while around 551
SDCs raised due to fault injection on Decode/Execute bits in the original version of
programs, SWIFT-transformation can only reduce the number of scaled-SDCs to 342
(only 40% improvement). gZDC-WithoutJumpDet is more effective than SWIFT and
can improve decode/execute scaled-SDC rate by 90% (from 551 to 37). However, there
is still some SDCs due to errors affecting branch immediate address (branches are
resolved at this stage). We can see that strategies proposed in this section for detecting
unexpected jumps are effective and none of the errors injected into decode/execute
remains undetected in gZDC protected version of programs.
Write back stage of the pipeline is responsible to select the source of register file
updates (functional unit in cases of arithmetic/logical instructions or memory in case
of load operations). Many of faults affecting this unit (around 14%) lead to SDC in
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Figure 5.9: Error Distribution.
the original version of programs. Although sensitive to errors, yet since the area of
writeback stage is small the chance of faults hitting its circuitry is low and therefore
its contribution in processor-wide vulnerability is small. While nZDC-based trans-
formations can completely remove the writeback stage vulnerability, SWIFT trans-
formation only improves its reliability by 22% (from 265 SDCs to 205). It can be
seen that all three versions of instruction duplications schemes can completely elim-
inate the vulnerability of ALU against single event transient faults injected on ALU
results. However, it is interesting to see the vulnerability of LSU actually increases
by a factor of 1.34x after applying SWIFT transformation. That is because SWIFT
transformation increases the number of memory instructions due to higher register
pressure and leave them unprotected. However, both gZDC-WithoutJumpDet and
gZDC transformations significantly improve the sensitivity of LSU (from 127 to 6 and
3 , respectively) because such schemes completely protect the execution of memory
operations unless address part of silent store operations.
Impact of protection schemes on fault distribution: Figure 5.9 shows the im-
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pact of instruction duplication schemes on error propagation and distribution. In the
Figure, X-axis shows different versions of benchmarks and the Y-axis represents the
percentage of masked, OS/HW Detected, SW Detected and scaled-SDCs. Across all
benchmarks, both SWIFT and nZDC-based transformations (gZDC-WithoutJumpDet
and gZDC) considerably reduce the number of masked errors (the lowest segment of
each bar in Figure 5.9) by on an average around 20%. Similarly, the number of
OS/HW detected faults also reduce on an average by half (from 14% to 7% for
SWIFT and to around 9% for gZDC-WithoutJumpDet and gZDC). Since the main
goal of instruction duplication error protection schemes is to prevent a program from
producing wrong results, an ideal scheme should only detect faults which are going to
alter the final program output. However, frequent error checks of SWIFT and nZDC-
based schemes introduce some false alarms by detecting benign faults (faults which
are going to be masked) and overprotection by detecting errors which are covered
by OS/HW error protection schemes. To estimate false alarm and over protection of
applied error protection schemes, we can analyze the difference between SW detected
errors of protected versions of code and the percentage of SDCs for the original ver-
sion of programs. While only on an average 8% of injected faults lead to SDCs in
original versions of programs, error checks in SWIFT, gZDC-WithoutJumpDet and
gZDC raise the error detection flag on average around 31.1%, 30.2% and 34.17% of
times, respectively.
5.2.6 Performance Overhead
Figure 5.10 depicts the execution time overhead of SWIFT, gZDC-WithoutJumpDet
and gZDC transformations which is on an average around 2.71x, 2.77x and 2.91x, re-
spectively. This amount of performance degradation is expected because around 2x
overhead comes from duplication and executing frequent error detection/checking in-
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Figure 5.10: Execution time overhead
structions also impose some performance degradation. Almost across all programs
(except bitcount and Qsort) gZDC-WithoutJumpDet transformation overhead is slightly
more than SWIFT, however, it achieves more than 5x protection. As the rightmost
bar for each benchmark shows, the execution overhead of applying coarse-grained
master-shadow instruction scheduling and applying asymmetric control-flow foot-
prints is only 4%, but they boost the error coverage by more than 5.2x.
5.3 Conclusions
In this chapter we implement, tune and evaluate the effectiveness of a generalized
version of our base error detection solution, named gZDC, on a Verilog description of
a simple in-order microprocessor. gZDC transformation consists of three main parts:
i) nZDC post-store data-flow error detection (explained in Chapter 2), ii) NEME-
SIS wrong-direction control-flow error detection (explained in Section 4.2.4) and iii)
coarse-grained main-redundant instruction scheduling and asymmetric control-flow
signatures for unexpected jump error detection. Verilog-level fault injection experi-
ments show that gZDC can achieve more than 99.9% error coverage.
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Chapter 6
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
Unprecedented proliferation of microprocessor-based systems in our lives, on one
hand, and microprocessors reliability decreasing trend, on the other hand, have been
made resilience of computer-based systems against hardware transient faults such a
crucial concern. Software-level resilience solutions are promising because against their
hardware-based counterparts they can accomplish flexible and salable protection.
While software-level solutions can be applied in different granularity, in this dis-
sertation we focused on low-level instruction replication error detection and correction
schemes. Our detailed analysis of the best known schemes revealed that many of the
existing schemes suffer from multitude vulnerability windows. For instance, almost
all related schemes replicate program arithmetic and logical instructions and check
for errors before the execution of critical instructions i.e. memory write and control
flow operations. This pre-store (and pre-branch) error protection strategy leaves the
execution of memory write operations (and control flow instructions) unprotected.
To overcome to the limitations of existing instruction-level redundancy-based error
protection scheme we propose post-store (and post-branch) error protection. Chapter
2 of this dissertation introduces nZDC as an effective error detection scheme. Against
prior solutions, nZDC detects the manifestation of errors on the results of critical
instructions rather than their register operands. Furthermore, we built upon nZDC
and proposed two error detection and correction solutions. The first recovery solution
is called InCheck (Chapter 3) and works based on basic-block level in-application
checkpointing and rollback strategy. The second recovery solution (Chapter 4) is a
forward recovery technique named NEMESIS which is based on error detection and
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on-demand correction rather than simple majority voting based error masking.
We evaluated the effectiveness of our proposed solutions by performing millions
microprocessor-wide random single bit-flip error injection at µ-architectural and Ver-
ilog level of abstractions (Chapter 5). Our results show that our proposed solutions
can accomplish several times higher error coverage than state-of-the-art schemes.
In this work, we have verified the effectiveness of our proposed solutions at µ-
architectural and Verilog level of abstractions. The last step in testing process is
radiation testing. One future work can be crash testing software solutions against
radiation bombardment.
Techniques presented in this dissertation are mainly concerned with single bit-flip
transient errors in microprocessor components excluding memory subsystem. How-
ever, in reality multiple transient and permanent errors can also occur and threat
the correctness of computations. More general (fault model independent) schemes
should be developed for systems which are susceptible to wide variety of hardware
malfunctions.
The main goal of this dissertation was to introduce highly effective error pro-
tection scheme and performance degradation was secondary concern. Adaptive and
selective usage of the proposed schemes can significantly improve the application-
level execution time. One of the challenge is to find the most critical computations
and only apply protection on them. Advanced compiler optimization can be used
for automatic critical region of code detection and protection. Similarly, the perfor-
mance overhead of proposed scheme can be improve significantly by shifting some
part of error resilience implementation to hardware. For instance, nZDC data flow
protection changes a program in a way that each store instruction has always loading-
back load instruction from the same memory location. Load-Store unit component
of microprocessor can be modified slightly to check for this property.
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